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Executive summary 
 
 
• Counterterrorism policy-making in Central Europe is driven to a large extent by 
foreign templates and the pressure to comply with internationally agreed 
measures and regimes. Domestically driven policy-making needs political 
impetus; generally, the degree of political involvement accurately mirrors the 
level of security threat perception and the counterterrorism agenda is not often 
an issue of political debate.   
 
• In Central Europe, the internal and external aspects of counterterrorism 
policies have been largely dominated by different templates, the internal by 
that of the EU, the external by that of NATO/U.S.; despite their 
complementarities, tensions and problems related to the lack of internal 
coherence and inconsistencies have emerged from time to time. Despite 
national action plans, counterterrorism policies have often been planned and 
executed by different competing power centres within nation states without the 
support of a unifying political dynamic or strategy. 
 
• Foreign templates used with existing domestic structures offer a reasonable 
means of improving areas where expertise is lacking; however, two problems 
appear widespread. First, the existence of different templates for modelling 
external and internal security policy domains is one of the factors contributing 
to a sort of “zero-sum game” within the competition of ideas in the defence 
policy discourse in Central European countries. Second, templates can work 
both ways –providing guidelines but also legitimizing ex-post or demanding 
extended competencies without a proper debate on appropriacy to tailor and 
control mechanisms. 
 
• The EU counterterrorism agenda is largely about law enforcement. 
Responsibility for the bulk of actions debated in Brussels falls back on member 
states; Whilst EU debates are good for building peer pressure, delivering on 
agreed policies is a national matter, and here the record is mixed. Central 
European countries suffer from the problem of “virtual” acquis.  
 
• The budget for counterterrorism purposes remains rather limited despite their 
growing economies, as the threat perception is low. 
 
• The public in Central Europe does not regard global terrorism as an imminent 
threat against their national territory.  
 
• It would be wrong to assume that the public is not interested in terrorism and 
counterterrorism measures. Public demand for competence-sharing between 
the EU and the nation states in the field of counterterrorism is high. Possible 
reasons for this are varied: incomplete understanding of what is actually meant 
by pooling of competencies by the EU; the assumption that global Jihadi 
terrorism threatens the developed world in general, but does not pose a 
particular threat to smaller nation–states but the developed world in general 
and that therefore the response has to come from and be guaranteed by a 
larger unit than the nation–state; low public confidence in Central Europe in 
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nation–state institutions and their response capabilities; the lack of experience 
in dealing with terrorism and generally low public awareness of the nature and 
scope of the response such a challenge requires.  
 
• Central European public opinion is not particularly sensitive to human rights 
and civil liberties violations in connection with counterterrorism measures, 
despite some suggesting they should instead show even greater sensitivity to 
such issues, as a result of their historical experience of living with communist 
“big brother” regimes. 
 
• Part of the public discourse on terrorism threat perception echoes 
islamophobia, present in the Central European societies since Islam is quite a 
new phenomenon in the region.  
 
• With rising living standards, Central European countries are experiencing the 
change from being transit countries for immigrants, to countries of final 
destination. The rising number of immigrants will bring about changes in the 
structure of Muslim minorities too. Societies will gradually have to 
accommodate demands related to freedom of religion and there are already 
public debates on various related topics. These debates do not conceal the 
fear that the changing Muslim minorities fail to strive for integration in the 
majority society.  
 
• Countering terrorism financing (CTF) and the anti–money laundering (AML) 
regimes were modelled solely according to the foreign templates with the 
former following, with delays, the latter. The legislative frameworks have not 
been completed so far and some of the Central European countries studied 
(Czech Republic, Slovakia) do not fully comply with international regimes, 
namely due to the absence of criminal liability of legal persons. Law 
enforcement results are also lacking in terms of specific prosecutions, 
convictions and asset recovery under the CFT regime, caused largely by 
deficiencies on the law enforcement and judiciary side, rather than the 
analytical one.  
 
• Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia have not carried out a review of the 
weaknesses of their Not-for-Profit Organization sectors, although plans for 
such a review, as well as for drafting better oversight measures, are contained 
in action plans. 
 
• The continuous reform attempts of the intelligence services have brought 
about mixed results; although partly driven by the NATO and EU accession, 
the primary impetus for most of the changes has been the need to overcome 
the legacy of previous regimes and the political struggles within the Central 
European countries studied themselves.  
 
• Intelligence services competencies must be strengthened but more 
transparency and better-functioning oversight mechanisms are needed. The 
reform of the intelligence services should not by undertaken for political 
purposes only but after a comprehensive debate, including examination of the 
 5
foreign templates and the transferability of their systems of checks and 
balances.  
 
• Inefficient inter-institutional counterterrorism policy coordination; the 
coordination of the inward- and outward-oriented counterterrorism policies is a 
problem, operational activities coordination is not functioning very well in most 
cases; efforts to add another layer of coordination, which would embrace all 
relevant bodies, usually break down over the need for a new legislative basis, 
the struggle for competencies and the resistance of existing institutions. 
Existing channels and instruments for cooperation should be improved and 
given additional power before new institutions and instruments are created, 
whilst adding new layers of coordination should also be given thorough 
consideration.  
 
• In the Central European countries studied, the EU is not seen as the forum for 
developing a coherent counterterrorism policy template; rather it is expected to 
continue to provide space for experience exchange and allow for creation of 
expertise in the fields in which they are lacking in it.  
 
• The absence of experience and expertise calls for the use of foreign templates 
and best practice in some areas of counterterrorism policy-making in Central 
Europe; moreover, the pressure of the EU and other international institutions 
to comply with adopted regimes and standards is needed in order to develop 
the counterterrorism policies and the legislative frameworks further.  
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 6
Introduction 
 
In this paper, the terms counterterrorism and counterterrorism policies are used as a 
general definition of a complex set of measures, actions and tools designed to 
prevent the perpetrators of terrorist acts preparing and completing their plans1.  
 
The paper does not aim at a comprehensive account and comparison of the 
counterterrorism policies of the four countries selected (the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) but rather at the testing of a number of hypotheses 
on counterterrorism policy-making. It also focuses on selected issues considered to 
be crucial for further development in the field. The similarities in historical experience 
and institutional features of the countries selected should allow for comparison as 
well as for a certain level of generalization.  
 
The response mechanisms which should be employed in case of a terrorist attack 
and their problematization in the Central European countries studied, will be tackled 
only marginally. Also the international counterterrorism efforts pursued by these 
countries in participating in foreign missions of military and non–military character are 
not deeply elaborated here, despite the fact they are an indispensable part of the 
overall security arrangements and the international cooperation of the Central 
European states in fighting terrorism. The author believes there is already a body of 
literature on the subject. 
 
Central Europe cannot be considered either as a driving force of international and 
supranational cooperation in the fight against global terrorism or a source of effective 
national measures to be implemented elsewhere in order to improve the prevention 
and responsive capacity. Together with the democratic transition and efforts to 
rebuild their societies and structures, these countries have been experiencing 
dramatic changes in security concepts and the security milieu since the end of the 
Cold War. With new security challenges and threats, the internal and external 
security concepts have gradually started to overlap, especially in the field of fighting 
terrorism, placing high demands on the institutional response and coordination 
                                                          
1 The narrow definition of counterterrorism states that only the actions conducted in order to stop a particular 
terrorist operation in progress can be labelled counterterrorism (Samson, 2003). 
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capacities on national, international and supranational levels. In case of Central 
Europe, the institutional responses have been lagging behind, due to several factors 
– unfinished transformation, continued structural weakness of the post–communist 
system, poor–performance of public administration, limited capability of effective and 
adequate strategic planning, persisting unresolved issues of divisions of 
competencies and responsibilities, unfinished legislative frameworks, problematic law 
enforcement, the so-called “historical burden” leading to continued mistrust of the 
partners within the wider intelligence community, mismanagement and lack of 
mechanisms for cyclical strategic reviews2. In the process of NATO and EU 
accession and membership, some of the major problems have been already 
removed, some still remain.  
 
Nation states are crucial actors in fighting terrorism. In this paper, it is assumed that 
the foreign templates provided by EU member states, the USA, the EU itself or other 
international organisations, as well as the pressure to comply, were crucial for 
counterterrorism policy–making in the Central European countries studied after 
regime change at the beginning of 1990´s and that the need for reform and relatively 
quick accession to these policies in the EU and transatlantic framework resulted in 
continuing adoption of new templates. Following this overall approach, it is also 
assumed that a number of other factors play a part in this process: these countries 
prefer to model their own counterterrorism policies on existing templates because 
they have very limited experience of new forms of global terrorism, and because 
counterterrorism policy–making is not an issue with the public, and as a result it is not 
a domestic political issue. With regard to their capabilities, resources and experience, 
it is also assumed that, as new EU member states, they should be supportive of the 
counterterrorism measures taken within the EU supranational framework. 
 
The templates are understood here as functionally emulated models3, where the 
models are adopted pragmatically and partially, with the process of modelling taking 
place on a voluntary and internally–driven basis, providing an outline for an 
institutional structure or policy. The template adoption does not imply a one–way 
hierarchical relationship; there are substantional organizational and intellectual 
                                                          
2 (Gogolewska, 2005) 
3 (Jacoby, 2001) 
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resources on the part of the Central European countries studied, which play a part in 
the process.  
 
Testing the hypotheses, desk research and interviews with selected experts were 
undertaken, both in person or using a short questionnaire. The research also aimed 
at capturing the major persistent issues which influence the system of 
counterterrorism policy making and counterterrorism performance of these 
countries4. The experts were questioned on the following: efficiency of coordination of 
the nation–state institutions in the field of counterterrorism policies, public opinion on 
terrorism and counterterrorism measures, the level of political involvement, the lack 
of experience with global terrorism, policy transfer and modelling, security systems 
and especially the intelligence services delivery efficiency and coordination, the 
interest in promoting further developments of EU policies and priority areas of the 
Central European member states in this field.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4 See also: EU Council, Final report on the Evaluation of National Anti-Terrorist Arrangements: Improving national 
machinery and capability for the fight against terrorism, September 2005, 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/05/st12/st12168.en05.pdf 
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I. Counterterrorism policies in Central Europe – policies under influence 
 
 
Counterterrorism policies and policy–making have gone through several stages in 
Central Europe since the beginning of 1990´s5. The new democracies did not start 
from scratch; they inherited legal frameworks and institutional settings, designed for 
the purposes of previous regimes. In many areas, such as intelligence services, it 
was not possible to undertake fundamental reform or set up completely new 
institutions. The lack of experienced human resources can be seen as the main 
reason for this, but there were also other security risks related to such steps; the 
reform of the national security sector was one of the most difficult tasks these 
countries had to accomplish. The first phase, which was carried out in the first half of 
1990´s, was dedicated to dismantling the communist legacy. The second phase was 
marked by the successful conclusion of NATO and EU accession negotiations; the 
foundations of the new counterterrorism policies and policy–making were laid. The 
last phase started with the NATO and EU membership and can be labelled as 
Internationalization and Europeanization6.  
 
Even if the decade between 1991 and 2001 brought some radical changes in the 
security sectors of the countries concerned, with the degree of implemented reforms 
varying from one sub-sector to another7, the turning point in counterterrorism policy–
making in the region came with the events of 9/11 20018. Until the 9/11 the security 
strategies of the Central European countries studied did not consider a large-scale 
terrorist attack to be a realistic possibility. Consequently, there were no national plans 
dealing with challenges related to global terrorism and no serious contingency plans 
for civil and military emergency services in case of a terrorist attack. Political 
representatives in Central European countries largely prioritized the external 
dimension of national security policies (with the exception of organized crime) and 
viewed this through the positive lense of international cooperation with the Western 
allies. This narrow view of the security situation, along with the simplified threat 
assessments, was challenged by 9/11 after which a new more complex approach to 
                                                          
5 (Mares, 2005) 
6 Ibid 
7 In that period the new national security strategies were adopted in Central European countries and a number of 
government reforms were prepared - the reforms of the military, police, intelligence and legal frameworks were 
amended or created anew in considerable part (see bellow).  
8 (Gogolewska, 2005), (Kousalova, Princova, Krulik, 2006) 
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counterterrorism began to emerge; reinforced by international developments and the 
need to comply with new instruments, now designed at the international level, namely 
that of the EU. The terrorist attacks which followed worldwide, but above all those in 
Madrid (March 2004) and in London (July 2005), intensified the efforts still further. 
 
 
The dynamics of counterterrorism policy–making in Central Europe 
 
Hypothesis: In the Central European countries studied, the regime change at the 
beginning of 1990´s, the need for reform and the relatively quick accession to the EU 
and transatlantic framework resulted in the continuing adoption of pre-existing, 
external templates rather than in the development of their own counterterrorism 
policies.  
 
Counterterrorism policy–making in the Central European countries studied features 
diverse and sometimes divergent dynamics. As elsewhere, the counterterrorism 
policy is not unified; ranging from the defence field to migration, it is not a policy in 
itself. It has frequently been planned and executed by different and often competing, 
power centres within the nation states, without a unifying political dynamic or strategy 
behind it; hence the counterterrorism policies have been quite open to shaping by 
different external demands and templates although the domestically driven reforms 
and measures taken in the realm the counterterrorism have also been marginally 
present. The simplified cleavage between domestically-9 and externally-driven 
dynamics is suggested here; with the externally-driven dynamics complicated further 
by competing templates and pressures to comply, which mostly work in synergy but 
sometimes can create tensions and incongruity as well.    
 
Despite the shifts in conceptions of power and vulnerability from the state-centric and 
territorial-based to the stateless and network-based and the reinforcement of 
international cooperation on various counterterrorism measures since 9/11, 
counterterrorism efforts and responsibilities rest largely with nation states10. The 
challenges of global terrorism are not the only security threat out there; as a result it 
seems that in Europe at least the “old fashioned” division of competencies and the 
                                                          
9 The templates are adopted on the internally-driven basis; the purely domestic solutions and policies are rather 
meant here.   
10 EU declared the bottom-up approach as the major determinant for further steps in the field.    
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institutional settings of a nation state will retain their traditional outlook11. The threat 
of global terrorism and the blurred division between external and internal security 
threats make high demands in terms of strengthening the coordination and 
cooperation both within a nation state and at the international level. However, the 
division internal/external still holds as a determinant, not only in Central Europe but 
elsewhere, too. In Central Europe the external part of counterterrorism policies12, and 
of security policies as such, has been dominated largely by the NATO/U.S. 
templates, whilst the internal dimension has been dominated by the EU, which has 
avoided offering a militarized response to the terrorist threat for various reasons13; 
despite their links and complementarities, problems related to the lack of internal 
coherence and inconsistencies have emerged from time to time. 
 
Modelling the policy or institutions according to a foreign template with regard to the 
existing domestic structures is a reasonable solution for improving areas where 
countries lack expertise. However, in case of Central European countries this 
process seems to contain two dangers. Firstly, different templates for modelling the 
external and internal domains of security policies have been used, one of the factors 
contributing to a sort of “zero-sum game” within the competition of ideas in the field of 
defence policy discourse in Central European countries; with the main templates 
provided by NATO and the U.S., Poland and Slovakia, for example, tend to perceive 
the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) development primarily through 
the lense of “duplicating NATO in the EU for solely political purposes”. Secondly, the 
templates can work both ways – to provide a guideline for policy or institutional 
improvement, but also to legitimize the steps already undertaken without a proper 
debate or proposals demanding extended competencies, sometimes without a proper 
set of control mechanisms. 
 
The external dynamics, predominantly modelling internal counterterrorism policy-
making of the Central European countries studied, was driven mainly by the EU, 
which in some cases even reinforced the international efforts in particular domains by 
                                                          
11 Pursuing rather the societal security concept (Hamilton, Sundelius, Grönvall, 2005) and holistic approach than 
turning to a homeland security template of the U.S. since it draws heavily on particular domestic structures and 
historical traditions.  
12 Aiming mainly at the military, in case of the humanitarian assistance, it is not of course the case.  
13 Also the other international organizations, especially the UN, Council of Europe, OECD and World Bank played 
part. 
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legislating further the issue, as in the case of countering terrorism financing14. 
Moreover, the pressure to comply is most efficient within the EU framework; the 
carrots and sticks of the accession negotiations being replaced by regular 
procedures, including judicial (ECJ) oversight of implementation process where 
applicable.  
 
After 9/11, Central European countries´ legislative frameworks were not suitable for 
fighting global terrorism, they were rather designed for fighting organized crime; for 
example acts of terrorism or the involvement in terrorist organizations15 were not 
codified as distinct types of criminal offence, the use of military troops in civilian 
emergencies and for counterterrorism purposes presented a similar picture. None of 
these countries prepared separate “terrorist laws” of the type seen in the USA (“the 
Patriot Act”), or the 2005 legislation in France16 and the UK. Penal Codes (in 
particular) have been gradually amended. 
 
During the accession period, Central European countries had already been adopting 
EU measures and modelling their counterterrorism documents, namely national 
action plans to combat terrorism, to comply with the EU17. The model for the national 
action plans was “The Resolution and Action plan of the Extraordinary Session of the 
European Council” of 21st September 2001 and the Road Map, adopted by the 
European Council in October 2001, which contains a number of concrete measures; 
this text became a model for the Hungarian action plan. After the attacks in the 
Madrid in March 2004, the European Council approved the Declaration on 
Combating Terrorism; Annex I of the Declaration is the updated Action Plan of the 
European Council. The objectives, listed in the Declaration and in the Action Plan, set 
                                                          
14 See bellow 
15 The definition of both offences copies almost word for word the EU definitions in Czech legal provisions.   
16 On November 29th, 2005, French National Assembly adopted a new law against terrorism. This law includes 
the development of video surveillance, as well as an easier access for the police to certain data (held by the 
Ministry of Interior). It reinforces the possibilities of surveillance of phone and electronic communications, and the 
obligation for some service providers to transfer certain data to the State (phone operators, transportation, 
internet cafes). It facilitates controls of identities on international trains. Another aspect of the law reinforces the 
penal sentences (20 years of imprisonment for a participation in a terrorist association, 30 years for the leaders) 
and centralizes the penal decisions and management in Paris. It also extends the time that French authorities are 
allowed to withdraw French nationality from people who have been convicted of terrorist offences committed 
before naturalization. Some aspects of the law will be re-evaluated by Parliament after three years. This law has 
been adopted in view of the perceived underlying necessity to adopt legislation to curb the threat of terrorism. 
However, the National Committee on Information Technology and Civil Liberties has made a statement 
considering that the new measures created by the law should be only considered as exceptional measures. 
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out the measures member states are obliged to complete, including the adoption of 
legal instruments like the European Arrest Warrant18. In the aftermath of EU 
accession certain fields of counterterrorism policies were given higher priority in 
Central European countries, such as border controls19, intelligence sharing or 
countering terrorism financing.  
 
EU peer evaluation missions in 2004 and 2005 assessed the degree of 
implementation20 of counterterrorism measures and the effectiveness of the systems 
in operation in the Central European countries studied21. For Poland and the Czech 
Republic22 the final conclusions of the peer evaluation were generally positive 
although the missions highlighted a number of substantial shortcomings, particularly 
in coordination and in information sharing systems.  
 
The implementation of the EU Action Plan and compliance with the international 
regimes has been further scrutinized by the EU Counterterrorism Coordinator. The 
Coordinator was appointed in the spring of 200423, but has no line-authority over the 
European Commission officials or over the member state agencies, and lacks a 
significant budget to promote counterterrorism measures. Assessing member state 
performance, the tactic of “naming and shaming” is largely used in order to speed up 
implementation; EU counterterrorism measures are largely about law enforcement. 
The bulk of actions debated in Brussels fall to member states; EU debates and 
evaluations are good for building peer pressure; delivering on agreed policies is a 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
17 The drafting of documents on counterterrorism already started in some countries before 9/11, In the Czech 
Republic, for example, as early as in the year 2000 the work on the secret conception called ”Study of the 
Preparedness of the CR for dealing with the Threat of Terrorist Attack” was undertaken.  
18 Implementation of the EAW was particularly complicated in the Czech Republic but it must be noted that the 
“old” member states implementation record of EAW was even worse, especially in Italy and Germany.   
19 Particularly in Poland, but also in Hungary and Slovakia; as these countries secure the EU external border 
20 On the other hand, the pressure before EU accession resulted in some accession countries, particularly 
Poland, being more advanced than the old EU members in terms of implementing the Framework Decisions listed 
in the Declaration on combating terrorism of 2004, including the European Arrest Warrant or the Joint 
Investigation Teams.  
21 On the basis of Council decision 2002/996/JHA from September 28, 2002, Member States have been 
evaluated by means of two questionnaires and on-site visits from June 2003 to May 2005 by teams consisting 
member states, European Commission, General Secretariat of the EU Council and Europol experts. The final 
report evaluates the whole system pinpointing the best practice of the other member states may consider and the 
substantial drawbacks. The reports usually address the following issues: intra-agency coordination, international 
cooperation, threat assessment, information collection and access to databases, police training and border 
control, legal bases, secure communications systems and security clearances and crisis management. After the 
mission a country report was drafted in six months and the concluding report was completed by the end of 2005. 
The concluding report was not made public in full length. See: EU Council, Final report on the Evaluation of 
National Anti-Terrorist Arrangements: Improving national machinery and capability for the fight against terrorism, 
September 2005, http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/05/st12/st12168.en05.pdf 
22 The reports on Hungary and Slovakia or their summaries were not made publicly available.  
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national matter, and here the record is more mixed in Central Europe. EU works 
rather as a horizontal network in the field of counterterrorism with the expertise based 
not in Brussels but in Paris or London.  
 
Aside from the general EU framework, the Central European countries studied also 
take part in cooperation between the groups of governments in Europe; Poland is 
member of the so called G–6 group, consisting of the six biggest countries– Great 
Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Poland. These countries work on 
improvements in their intelligence sharing and at the moment, they do not appear to 
be willing to share with the rest of the EU member states in the same way; they do 
not trust all the governments in the EU; but the eventual involvement of more 
countries in the future is not excluded. All four countries surveyed are members of 
the Salzburg Group24, established in 1999 in order to coordinate the security agenda 
of the interior ministries of the acceding countries. This regional cooperation has 
continued since accession and the group was enlarged to include Austria and most 
recently Romania; counterterrorism measures are part of the agenda25. Another 
example of the enhanced intergovernmental cooperation is the Treaty of Prum26, 
which was signed by seven member states, none of them Central European, in 2005, 
to intensify their police and judicial cooperation. 
 
NATO27 and the U.S. mostly shaped the external military dimension of the 
counterterrorism policies, namely the issue of armed forces reform, which were 
NATO-centred and US-assisted, although NATO accession also implied changes in 
some internal measures like revision of the classification and clearances regimes in 
Central European countries. The U.S. models were used for templates in the domain 
of countering terrorism financing although not directly, but rather through the regimes 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
23 Mr. Gijs de Vries was appointed the first Counterterrorism coordinator by the European Council.  
24 Together with Austria, Slovenia and Romania  
25 However, counterterrorism is not the main decisive issue; priorities for 2006 are Schengen evaluation; 
coordination of tasks connected with the area of witness protection, approach to the future exchange of credible 
and updated information regarding the country of origin and coordination of efforts in the area of road traffic patrol 
and safety on roads. 
26 The so-called Schengen III was signed by Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Spain, France 
and Austria.  As Daniel Keohane has noted, the signatories declared that the other EU member states are 
welcomed to join in 2008 and there is a lot of speculation that it will become an EU wide measure by the end of 
decade.  
27 NATO took decisive steps in order to play a role in the counterterrorism operations. At the Prague summit in 
November 2002, it changed from being solely a defensive organization for preserving stability by formally 
endorsing out-of-area military operations and by approving a U.S. proposal to form an elite NATO reaction force 
(NRF).      
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developed within the international framework28. The influence of the U.S. varies 
considerably from country to country29 as well as on an ad hoc basis; however, even 
if the practical policy influence is close to zero, the ideological or political impact of 
U.S. concepts on the public debate is significant and strong, unlike in case of EU. 
The cooperation between the Central European countries studied and the U.S. 
following 9/11 is embodied namely in the revision of the existing security strategies 
and the subsequent works on the sectoral strategies, and in the case of Poland the 
Strategic Defence Review30.  
 
The Homeland security concept is defined in the U.S. national security strategy as a 
concerted national effort to prevent a terrorist attack within the U.S. territory, to 
reduce vulnerability, minimize damage and assure the recovery. In Europe, there is 
not the same historical tradition of centralization of competencies and capabilities as 
in the US and no European country is ready to implement anything equivalent to 
Homeland Security. However, expert opinion varies on the issue.  As one expert put 
it: “U.S. counterterrorism models are underrated in the European debate. The 
establishment of a Homeland Security Department, the integration of intelligence 
services, as well as some novel uses of the military, are groundbreaking steps; they 
stand as a model for Europe, which is only waking up to the new terrorism.” 
 
 
Public Opinion 
 
Hypothesis: The Central European countries studied prefer to adopt existing 
templates than create their own counterterrorism policies since counterterrorism 
policymaking is not an issue with the public; with regard to the level of security risks 
perception the public is not interested in active pursuing of counterterrorism policies 
by the political elites.  
 
EU Counterterrorism Coordinator Gijs de Vries stated that public opinion is a critical 
component in any counterterrorism strategy. Formulation of counterterrorism policies 
and legal frameworks in order to operate against terrorism often calls for public 
support. In this part, the attitudes of the public in the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
                                                          
28 See the section Countering terrorism financing 
29 With the strongest involvement in Poland, followed by Hungary; Poland, for example, modelled a special 
counterterrorism military unit, known as the Operational and Mobile Reconnaissance Group (GROM) according to 
the US Delta force and also the British SAS in 1990. Poland public was informed only in 1994 about GROM 
existence when the unit took part in the mission of allied forces in Haiti and later in former Yugoslavia.   
30 The Polish approach to the security and counterterrorism mirrored that from the U.S. strategy in its holistic 
character and the angle towards military responses, see (Gogolewska, 2005). 
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Poland and Slovakia towards terrorism, counterterrorism policies, threat perception, 
trust in response mechanisms, preparedness and possible links between the public 
opinion and the counterterrorism policymaking are examined.  
 
Apart from the standard set of Eurobarometer31 data concerning terrorism, the 
surveys available from national polling institutions32 will be used. A worldwide survey 
on terrorism threat perception conducted by Synovate, a market research company, 
between September and October 2005 in 13 countries33 is also used here. In the 
most opinion polls, counterterrorism policies are usually rather a side issue; not the 
main topic surveyed34. The only opinion poll on counterterrorism policy was carried 
out in Hungary in June 2004 by the Centre for Strategic and Defence Studies in 
Budapest, asking the respondents to asses the effectiveness of particular 
counterterrorism policy tools35. It is worth noting that the only detailed survey on 
counterterrorism policies in Central Europe was conducted by a think–tank; no 
national–based polling institute is willing to conduct such a qualitative survey. The 
obvious reason is the lack of demand and as one expert put it: “No survey institute is 
ready to loose precious money to conduct such polls, because the result would not 
affect any political decisions.” Ferenc Molnar, who conducted the only special survey 
on counterterrorism policy in Hungary, regrets the absence of budget to carry out 
another similar survey and he also points out that there is rather a general problem: „I 
would also say that only the surveys of imminent importance are ordered by the state 
and scientific surveys are lacking financial support in the field of security and 
defence.”36 These statements also demonstrate, that counterterrorism policymaking 
is a rather under-politicized topic in the public domain in Central Europe despite the 
essential nature of public approval and media scrutiny of further institutional and 
                                                          
31 Standard Eurobarometer 64 and 65 (autumn 2005, spring 2006) – Country reports for the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, See http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/index_en.htm, 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb65/eb65_en.htm 
32 CVVM–CZ, TNS OBOP–PL, see References for details. 
33 http://www.synovate.com/knowledge/infact/issues/200510/. A little over 9.000 respondents were surveyed in 13 
countries.  
34 For example Public Opinion Research Centre (CVVM) in Prague questioned the respondents on terrorism in 
connection to the NATO membership and NATO enlargement, Defence strategy of the Czech Republic or the war 
in Iraq. See http://www.cvvm.cas.cz/index.php?lang=1. Polish institute TNS OBOP runs the regular survey “Do we 
feel secure” including all kinds of threats but one special survey on terrorism threat perception was run by TNS 
OBOP in August 2004.    
35 See Molnar, Ferenc, the Hungarian Public’s Perception of Terrorism, DCAF Conference Paper. 
http://www.dcaf.ch/news/past_2005/ev_moscow_050489_paper4.pdf 
36 Ibid 
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legislative steps as well as the discussion on the nature of the threat posed by 
terrorism, the ways leading to radicalization and the response measures.  
 
The last Eurobarometers37 show that only a minority of the population of the Central 
European countries studied considers terrorism to be one of the most serious 
problems facing their countries. With the EU average reaching 14% and 10% 
respectively in spring 2006, the number for the Czech Republic has increased from 
the 2% in the spring 2005 to 3% in the autumn 200538 and decreased to 1% in spring 
2006. In Hungary and Poland only 2% and 3% respectively consider terrorism to be a 
serious problem, both in autumn 2005 and spring 2006. The number for Slovakia 
dropped from 5% in autumn 2005 to 3% in spring 200639.  
 
The other set of questions targets the pooling of competencies between the nation–
states and EU. When presented with the struggle against terrorism all the Central 
European countries studied score above the EU average in preferring joint progress 
in the field of counterterrorism to policy–making at the level of the nation state. 
Slovakia leads the league table of member states with 91% public support for shared 
decision–making, Hungary is second with 90%, the Czech Republic and Poland 
share third place with the Netherlands, Estonia and Latvia with 88% support. On 
average 78% of EU citizens prefer joint-EU to national action, so the level of support 
across the EU is generally high. Apart from terrorism, only research and development 
with 69% support, protection of the environment (66%) and defence and external 
relations (63%) scored so high within this set of questions. The lowest support for 
pooled competencies in the field of fighting terrorism are presented by EU countries 
which have experienced terrorist attacks quite recently – UK and Spain with 63% and 
67% support respectively.  
 
                                                          
37 Standard Eurobarometer 64 and 65 (autumn 2005, spring 2006) 
38 According to CVVM opinion poll on security strategy and NATO enlargement done in November 2002, 10% of 
Czechs believed terrorism is a major problem of the country. This number is possibly connected to the imminent 
issue of the NATO summit in Prague. In August 2005, According to the same polling institution, only 1% of 
Czechs perceived terrorism as the country’s main problem 
http://www.cvvm.cas.cz/upl/zpravy/100505s_ps50822.pdf 
39 The most serious problem is considered to be unemployment with 48% in the Czech Republic, 50% in Hungary, 
71% in Poland, and 49% in Slovakia. The EU average for unemployment is 44%. A few EU countries, in particular 
those where terrorist attacks took place or particular threats were voiced, experienced an increase terrorist threat 
perception. In the UK for example, a 20 point increase was recorded (from 14% in spring 2005 to 34% in autumn 
2005) and in the Netherlands of 18 points (from 22% to 40%). The concerns have also increased significantly in 
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Lastly, the Eurobarometer also polls for the EU future priorities. In the Czech 
Republic, the preference given to the fight against terrorism as one of the EU 
priorities can be clearly observed – a 9 point increase has been recorded (from 15% 
in spring 2005 to 24% in autumn 2005) with the EU average raising from 19% in 
spring 2005 to 23% in autumn 2005. Also 18% of Slovaks and 17% of Hungarians 
think terrorism should be the future priority of the EU40.  
 
High public demand for competence sharing between the EU and the nation states in 
the field of counterterrorism in the Central European countries studied encourages 
theorizing. Naturally, it is hard to assess whether the supporters of pooling 
competencies understand the issue in the way the EU itself does, i.e. the 
communitarization of certain policy domains governed by unanimity but with the main 
counterterrorism agenda being carried out by the member states. According to the 
opinion polls, one could assume that the citizens of the Czech Republic, Poland, 
Hungary and Slovakia tend to perceive terrorism as not endangering particularly their 
rather small nation states but the developed world in general and the international 
system as such; the response then should come from and be guaranteed by a larger 
unit than the nation–state. Even in case of Poland, which cannot be considered small 
country and aspires to more visible role in the field of counterterrorism, a certain 
alienation from the policymakers who are pushing for a more autonomous course, for 
example in fighting terrorism abroad, can be observed on the part of a significant part 
of public opinion. Low trust on the part of the Central European public of nation state 
institutions and response capabilities both also contribute to the overall explanation41. 
Another fact is the lack of experience with terrorism and generally low public 
awareness of the nature and response scope necessitated such a challenge. For the 
general public, it is also difficult to asses on which level counterterrorism policies 
need to be undertaken in order to be effective.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Denmark; despite the absence of attacks 32% of Danes see terrorism as one of the most serious problems (+20 
points).  
40 With fight against poverty and unemployment leading the priorities chart (44% and 43% EU average), followed 
by keeping peace and stability in Europe and fight against organized crime (28% and 25% EU average), terrorism 
follows the suit with 23% EU average.  
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Trust in national institutions, Eurobarometer 64 and 6542 
 Government Parliament  
 Tend to trust 
(autumn 2005) 
Tend to trust 
(spring 2006) 
Tend to trust 
(autumn 2005) 
Tend to trust 
(spring 2006) 
Czech Republic 26% 34% 16% 22% 
Hungary 33% 48% 26% 47% 
Poland 14% 22% 12% 13% 
Slovakia 18% 21% 20% 27% 
EU average 31% 35% 35% 38% 
 
 
As far as the threat perception43 is concerned, the opinion polls provide mixed 
results. As in Sweden, Finland, and Austria44 and, outside the EU, Switzerland and 
Norway, one would assume there to be a strong belief that “it can’t happen here”; but 
it is not quite the case. The ambivalence is also mirrored in the public discourse and 
media coverage. Some claim that being small states, the Czech Republic, Slovakia 
and Hungary enjoy the advantage of being less irrelevant on the international stage 
and it is questionable how many people outside the countries knew of their 
involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns, which are generally regarded as the 
main reasons for a possible terrorist attack. Also the almost negligible number of 
Muslims is seen as the crucial advantage. In addition to fighting terrorism abroad, the 
other reasons why they might be a terror target usually indicate the fact of belonging 
to the Western world and to special issues, which could arose terrorist interest – 
hosting Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty in case of the Czech Republic or the Taszar 
air base in case of Hungary for example. Some Polish experts also stated in the 
media that Poland had become a potential target for terrorist groups because of the 
news about clandestine CIA prisons allegedly hosted by the country45. Some point at 
the fact that, although by virtue of their size etc. they are unlikely to be major targets 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
41 According to the same polls, the trust in EU institutions is also generally high in the Central Europe, too, which 
may also partly explain the findings.  
42 Fieldwork for Eurobarometer 64 was done in October and November 2005, quite shortly after the parliamentary 
elections in Poland (September 2005) and quite shortly before the parliamentary elections in Hungary (May 
2006), the Czech Republic (June 2006) and Slovakia (June 2006, preliminary elections). Fieldwork for 
Eurobarometer 65 was done in May, June and July 2006, in time of elections in Hungary, Czech Republic and 
Slovakia.  
43 Generally within Europe and the EU, there are big differences in the threat perception and the divide runs 
clearly between East and West. In Western Europe, the average percentage of those who think terrorism is the 
most important security issue varies between 20–40%; further east it starts falling rapidly. As Daniel Keohane has 
noted, this feeds into a perception generally shared in Brussels that Central and Eastern European governments 
don’t feel they are in the line of fire the way the Western European governments do.  
44 An interesting observation is made by Hamilton, Sidelius and Grönvall (2005) that the neutral states in this 
sense believe the neutrality protects them in some way.  
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of terrorist attack, still they may suffer the aftermath of terrorist attack in neighbouring 
countries. Part of the terrorism threat perception discourse also echoes 
islamophobia, which is present in the Central European societies in view of the fact 
that Islam is quite a new phenomenon in this territory46. 
   
Overall it appears that the public perception of the imminence of the threat posed by 
terrorism also naturally varies according to the nature of the polling question used; 
however, the threat perception clearly exists and the explanation lies in the external 
security policy these countries pursue; being more or less staunch US allies and 
labelled “new” Atlanticist Europe47, all four Central European states were directly 
included to the list of targets by Al–Qaeda’s fatwas because of their participation in 
the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Concrete threats were also voiced; Poland 
was named by the Tawhid Islamic Group, a previously unknown group declaring itself 
to be an Al–Qaeda cell in Europe and threatened attacks in July 2004 if the Polish 
troops remained in Iraq. Furthermore, the Slovak Embassy in Baghdad was 
attacked48 and a warning of a possible attack against Slovakia was voiced on a 
Middle Eastern radio station49. All issues of such a nature are naturally covered by 
the domestic media. 
 
As the data suggests, the majority public in the Central Europe does not consider 
terrorism to be the future problem50 of their countries but, according to some polls, it 
does not exclude that its national territory can be subject to imminent threat of 
terrorist attack. It is also interesting that the public in the Central Europe does not 
think its country is well prepared and ready to deal with it. This sharply contrasts with 
the situation in Western European countries which have experienced terrorist attack. 
According to TNS OBOP, the Polish polling agency which undertook a survey on 
terrorist attack threat perception in Poland in August 2004, 74% of Poles think Poland 
could become the target. Only 18% of Poles believe that the country is well prepared 
to deal with an act of terrorism and only 16% believe the public Integrated Rescue 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
45 See for example http://english.people.com.cn/200512/17/eng20051217_228656.html 
46 The recent activities of the Czech National Party serve as an example. The leaflets inciting against Muslims 
were distributed before a party gathering. The police detained some party members after the public meeting. 
47 U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld divided Europe into “old” and “new” in his speech in January 2003. 
48 Later investigation proved that the action was not politically motivated; it was a simple case of looting.  
49 Source: Mario Nicolini 
50 See Eurobarometer data above. 
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System (police, fire brigades, medical assistance and army) is ready to cope with 
such a “disputive challenge”. The detailed survey carried out by the Centre for 
Strategic and Defence Studies in Budapest in June 2004 adds to the mixed results of 
the opinion polls on the threat perception. It found that the overwhelming majority 
(85%) of respondent’s perceived terrorism as both a real and serious threat to 
Hungary. Yet according to Ferenc Molnar, “they [Hungarian respondents] perceived a 
number of threats to be real. That is the nature of our societies. Terrorism is not the 
top threat for Hungarians.” Indeed, in this survey, climate change, pandemics, 
pollution and drug-trafficking all scored higher than terrorism. 
 
A survey conducted by Synovate between September and October 2005 in 13 
countries 51 shows the difference between Western and Eastern Europe. Whereas 
84% of French respondents and 68% of Dutch respondents considered that their 
country would be the target of a terrorist attack in the near future, only 17% of 
Hungarians and 12% of Slovaks gave the same answer. Percentages were higher in 
Poland, where around 37% of respondents answered positively. However, this is still 
relatively low number compared to Western Europe, where even Germany (47%) 
registered a higher percentage52. In the same survey, the affirmation “I don’t feel as 
safe as I used to” resulted in similar percentages in both Central and Western Europe 
(e.g. 40% in Hungary and 44% in the Netherlands, 55% in Poland and 61% in 
France). These numbers illustrate that the gap between the regions widens when 
terrorism is mentioned explicitly in the question, as compared to the situation where 
the questions merely ask about perception of the “dangerous world” and security 
threats in general. 
 
Polling for the question: “Do you think your country is well prepared to respond to a 
terrorist attack?” resulted in 89% of Poles, 76% of Hungarians and 71% of Slovaks, 
answering “no”. These numbers are much higher comparing to French (46%) or 
British (48%) respondents. On the whole, the three Central European countries cited 
belong to those with the highest percentages of all the countries polled, together with 
the Netherlands (79%) and USA (73%). As in case of pooling competencies with the 
                                                          
51 The countries surveyed were: France, the Netherlands, Hong–Kong, India, Indonesia, Hungary, Germany, 
Poland, Singapore, Serbia and Montenegro, USA, Great Britain and Slovakia. 
52 With the plot (attacks on regional trains in Germany) which was interrupted this summer, the number will most 
probably increase.  
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EU, the explanation can again be linked to the low trust on the part of the Central 
European public in the nation–state institutions, the lack of experience of the threat of 
terrorism and next to no experience of testing response mechanisms. 
 
This chapter shows that the public in Central Europe does not see terrorism as an 
imminent problem for their countries and, above all, does not consider that terrorism 
represents an urgent threat to their national territory, even where the general threat 
perception related to the security risks, including terrorism, is present53. Unlike in 
Western Europe, where the percentages are high both for the threat perception 
posed by terrorism and confidence in the effectiveness of the response by the nation 
state, the public in Central Europe does not think their countries are well prepared. 
There have been several attempts to test response mechanisms. However, such 
efforts have been largely perceived as political gestures, dictated by events 
elsewhere including foreign acts of terrorism and by higher security demands on the 
part of the public. An example of the latter is the testing of the Integrated Rescue 
System response to a terrorist attack in the Prague subway in autumn 2005, following 
the attacks in London.     
 
There is also public support for sharing more competencies in the fight against 
terrorism with supranational institutions, namely with the EU. However, it is hard to 
assess whether there a clear conception of the nature of cooperation and future 
policy priorities exists, in this sense. According to given data, it is also hard to assess 
to what extent the public is interested in actively pursing counterterrorism policies 
within their nation states, and which policy moves might be sensitive. It can be 
expected that the debates on counterterrorism measures in connection with possible 
human rights violations will emerge with the attempts of the Central European 
governments to undertake new legislative steps reinforcing, inter alia, the 
competencies of intelligence services. On the other hand, it appears that the citizens 
of Central European countries are not particularly sensitive towards any symptoms of 
human rights and civil liberties violations in connection with counterterrorism 
                                                          
53 With the process of internationalization, the public in the Central European countries studied perceives that 
being European or a “citizen of the world” is more dangerous than being Hungarian or Czech.  Consequently, they 
feel it is necessary to counter terrorism on levels of decision-making other than the national one. As Ferenc 
Molnar has underlined, “the Hungarian public considers it an international duty and is willing to contribute when 
legally and morally acceptable steps are taken.” 
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measures, which some commentators suggest is a phenomenon caused by historical 
experience with communist “big brother” regimes54. 
 
Comparing the data for Central and Western Europe, it is clear that there is a link 
between threat perception and the public debate on the counterterrorism policies. 
The impact of public opinion on political decision making in the field of 
counterterrorism policies in the Central European countries studied is minimal. It is 
brought about by the nature of the policy itself as well as the lack of elaborated public 
opinion surveys and data analyses. There is no pressure at the moment on politicians 
in Central Europe to go public with their counterterrorism policies proposals to secure 
support. As one expert has stated, “Still, there has been little public diplomacy to elicit 
the support of citizens for crisis response or for possible human rights measures. I 
would hate for it to take an attack in order for us to wake up to the threat, but this 
scenario is quite likely.”  
 
The other reason is that security is not an issue during national elections in the 
Central European states studied since there is a general tendency to give 
precedence to economic issues when voting.  However, it would be wrong to assume 
that the public is not interested in terrorism and counterterrorism measures; rather it 
is more a question of there not being enough ways to voice it. There is also a danger 
that a terrorist attack on the Central European countries studied would very probably 
have a devastating effect on the countries' esprit. It is questionable whether the 
public would unite in support of governments, as they clearly did in the UK, for 
example. Citizens are generally distrustful of nation-state institutions, as 
demonstrated in the surveys. If the governments in question failed to prevent or 
adequately respond to an act of terrorism, it could lead to political instability.  
 
 
 
                                                          
54 For example the e–petition “Data retention is not a solution” which emerged in autumn 2005 in connection to 
the EU legislation on data-retention, when it was argued that the EU needs new data privacy rights as 
international law enforcement authorities try to fight terrorism was signed by 848 Hungarians, 648 Polish, 309 
Czechs and 74 Slovaks in comparison to 21612 Dutch, 6969 Germans or 5984 Fins. See 
http://www.dataretentionisnosolution.com/. Or the issue of PNR, list of data on airline passengers, linked with a 
wider EU debate on the balance between privacy rights and accelerating counterterrorism measures has not 
provoked a debate in Central Europe.  
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Experience with terrorism 
 
Hypothesis: The Central European countries studied would rather adopt existing 
templates than create their own counterterrorism policies since they have very limited 
direct experience of global Islamist terrorism. 
 
Despite the historical experience with terrorism of different kinds55, none of the 
Central European countries studied has had to face the consequences of acts of 
global Islamist terrorism so far; no large scale terrorist attack has ever occurred on 
their territories, nor have their citizens suffered from terrorist attacks abroad in the 
way that, for example, Australian citizens did in Bali. This said, such experiences do 
not seem to be the only trigger for efficient implementation of counterterrorism 
measures and policies development. Looking at the case of the Netherlands, which 
had long resisted bolstering existing counterterrorism measures, refusing for example 
to apply the EU list of terrorist organizations and individuals, the catalyst event 
triggering major changes in the counterterrorism policy was the murder of the film 
director Theo van Gogh. Denmark offers another example56. However, experience of 
global Islamist terrorism in the Central European countries studied does not go much 
further than threat assessment, preventive monitoring of suspicious individuals and 
protection of critical points and infrastructure; in addition, the experience of 
countering organized crime is worth noting - terrorism financing and money 
laundering are interconnected phenomenon, although the record of the Central 
European countries studied is rather mixed in this field.  
 
After the fall of their communist regimes, the risks posed by terrorism increased in 
Central European countries, mainly due to two factors. Firstly, the role these 
countries played on the international scene under their previous regimes changed 
dramatically, former friends were also cast off, or became enemies. The friendly 
relations which had existed with Libya or the PLO, for example, were abandoned, 
however, the networks of contacts on the territories of Central European states 
remained. Secondly, the involvement of the new democracies in international 
                                                          
55 For details see (Mares, 2005), (Samson, 2003), (Gogolewska, 2005). Only a few terrorist-related cases have 
been encountered in Central European countries since the beginning of 1990´s and instead of relating to 
international terrorism they were actually forms of domestic terrorism, including offences such as hostage-taking 
or other serious offences endangering public order. 
56 It is, however, questionable whether the emergency situation caused by the terrorist threat alert, which the 
Czech Republic, for example, experienced in September 2006, could work the same way.   
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operations, namely in Kuwait, the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as their 
NATO membership itself, also increased the overall security risks57.  
 
Preventive monitoring concerns domestic left- and right-wing radicals. It also 
concerns those Muslim minorities and individuals suspected of involvement in the 
activities of radical Islamist groups. They may be residents but in most cases they are 
merely transiting the territory of the Central European countries studied. The Muslim 
minorities are rather sensitive issue not only because these Central European 
countries remain largely inexperienced in the field of countering radicalization and 
preventing recruitment to terrorist groups, but also due to the fact that without being 
completely new, the phenomenon of Muslim minorities has until now been alien to 
them. It is viewed as something exotic by the public and the majority of the citizens 
have only a vague understanding of Islam and its followers58. 
 
Of the four countries examined, none has a large Muslim minority. In Poland, where 
the country is dominated by Christians, who make up as much as 99% the 
population, there are approximately 30,000 foreign Muslims and between 500 and 
1,000 Polish Muslims. In the Czech Republic, the number given varies from between 
10,000 and 20,000 Muslims, with around 400 Muslims of Czech origin. Estimates of 
the Muslim population in Slovakia vary from between 300 and 3,000 and in Hungary 
from 10,000 and 20,00059. The Muslim communities are quite well integrated into the 
respective societies and members of foreign origin usually posses a higher education 
degree and a command languages. With the raising standard of living, the Central 
European countries studied are experiencing a change from being transit countries to 
becoming countries of final destination, and the number of immigrants from the 
Balkans, the Caucasus and from Arab countries is expected to rise; this is also 
bringing a change in the structure of Muslim minorities. The societies will gradually 
have to accommodate demands related to freedom of religion and there are already 
public debates on various related topics in Central European countries60. These 
                                                          
57 The key event in the region as far as the security and counterterrorism measures are concerned was the NATO 
summit in Prague in November 2002. As a result of the summit, new institutional platforms for the coordination of 
counterterrorism efforts emerged in the Czech public administration (see Coordination section). 
58 For example, according to an opinion poll carried out by STEM agency in the Czech Republic in September 
2006, 60% of Czechs stated they fear Islam, without any other specification.   
59 Approximate total populations:  Poland (40m), Czech Republic (10.2m), Slovakia (5.4m) and Hungary (10.1m). 
60 In the Czech Republic, Islam was registered as an officially recognized religion only in 2004. The government is 
currently deciding on the application of the exemption from the legal provision with only allows religious societies 
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debates do not conceal the fear that the changing Muslim minorities will not strive for 
integration to the majority society.  
 
According to public reports by various authorities, the Muslim communities did not 
pose any security problems until 2003 and the start of the Iraq crisis61, which not only 
increased the direct security risk but also marked the start of some undesirable 
activities within the Muslim communities and an increased inflow of individuals with a 
mission to radicalize their members. In addition, the intelligence services also 
reported the efforts to monitor Muslim humanitarian or non-profit organizations known 
elsewhere for their involvement in sponsoring terrorism62, the transit of persons 
involved in the terrorist activities, the travels of a limited number of citizens to conflict 
zones, cases of terrorist organization financing63 or the efforts to obtain arms, 
explosives and so-called “sensitive technology” linked to organized groups, possibly 
connected to terrorist organizations or individuals suspected of the involvement with 
terrorist activities.    
 
At the moment none of the countries surveyed has a comprehensive strategy on how 
to counter radicalization or how to prevent recruitment to terrorist groups. The Czech 
Republic and Slovakia have declared in their action plans on combating terrorism that 
such a strategy needs to be developed by the end of 2007 on the basis of EU 
recommendations. An action plan on combating radicalization and recruitment to 
terrorism has been put to the fore by the EU counterterrorism coordinator Gijs de 
Vries in December 2005, following the UK proposal submitted shortly after the 
London bombings in July64. The Central European countries studied are waiting for a 
template from the EU level, based on the experiences of other member states, even 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
to conduct religious services such as weddings or education only after 10 years of registration. The Czech 
counterintelligence service expressed its dissent despite reports and statements showing trouble-free relations 
with the Muslim minority in the Czech Republic. Another issue concerns the authorizations for building mosques 
with opposition coming mostly from local politicians.   
61 The monitoring of foreign Muslims living or studying in Central European countries goes back to the pre-1989 
period. 
62 Also before 2003 
63 E.g. Hamas, which is on the EU list of terrorist organizations.  
64 The action plan on radicalization and recruitment states that the EU needs to "engage with Muslim 
organizations and faith groups to reject the distorted version of Islam put forward by Al-Qaeda and others", and 
should also "create a non-emotive lexicon for discussing the issues in order to avoid linking Islam to terrorism".  In 
addition, an expert group on Violent Radicalization composed of academics was also established by the 
European Commission in April 2006. Several expert meetings have been convened to allow for exchange of 
national experiences and the identification of good practices since then, discussing radicalization in prisons, 
threats posed by returning Jihadists and strategies to encourage recruits to leave terrorist groups. To the author’s 
knowledge, no expert from the Central European states studied has taken part in the work of this group.  
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though the situation on the ground differs in these countries. The reason is that they 
lack the experts and expertise65. The creation of cross-border networks among 
European experts and intensified contacts between counterparts elsewhere 
represents a particularly useful aspect of the work carried out so far in this field and 
Central European Countries should profit from it, building their expertise gradually66. 
Another area where these countries face similar problems is the use of the Internet 
for terrorist purposes and terrorism promotion67.  
 
 
Countering terrorism financing 
 
The fact that in the field of financing terrorism has “gone global” requires a continuing 
response and cooperation on the international level. The Central European countries 
studied were not well equipped for fighting terrorism in this area; most of the 
institutions68, legal frameworks and policies were modelled on international templates 
for countering terrorism financing (CTF), following the introduction of anti–money 
laundering (AML) regimes and using the existing AML regime structures. Countering 
terrorism financing has been lagging behind, largely due the feeling that these 
offences are not relevant to these Central European countries. The authorities in 
these countries have worked on key draft legislative reforms to bring their legislation 
into full compliance with the international requirements necessary for EU accession, 
with some legislation coming into force only recently69. Legislation criminalizing the 
financing of terrorism, authorizing criminal liability for legal persons and enacting 
other provisions related to the fight against the financing of terrorism has been 
continuously drafted or amended. Moreover, suspicious transaction reporting (STR) 
systems have had to be improved in order to cover transactions suspected of aiming 
at the financing of terrorism. Compliance with international standards has been 
assured by the supervision of key international organisations in the field70. However, 
                                                          
65 There are many prominent academics in the field Islamic studies in Central Europe; it is experts on 
radicalization and recruitment with a background in Islamic studies who are lacking.  
66 To prevent radicalization outside the EU, according to their action plans or statements the Central European 
states studied will take part in projects elsewhere, namely in the Mediterranean. 
67 Coordination and surveillance of the Internet by national law enforcement authorities and Europol will be 
discussed during the upcoming German EU presidency. 
68 Most notably the Financial Analytical Units, which are responsible for analyzing the suspicious transactions.  
69 E.g. in the Czech Republic an amendment to Criminal Code came into effect in October 2004 making terrorist 
attacks a crime (in Poland this had already happened in 2002). In Slovakia, the banking laws and the Penal Code 
were appropriately amended only in 2005. 
70 As one government expert put it; “the IMF, UN and EU questionnaires made us comply”. 
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despite these efforts, effective investigation and prosecution is still sometimes 
jeopardized by the absence of a comprehensive legal basis.  
 
All four countries have now ratified the 1999 UN Convention on the Suppression of 
Terrorist Financing (the Czech Republic only as recently as January 2006)71. Also the 
EU has continued to strengthen its legislative framework to combat terrorist financing 
following the recommendations and findings of FATF72. The last comprehensive step 
is the adoption of the Third Money Laundering Directive73 in October 2005 (in effect 
since December 2005), covering several key aspects of the nine FATF Special 
Recommendations. The EU directive is in the implementation phase at the moment 
(ending on December 12, 2007). 
 
Of the countries surveyed, the Czech Republic and Slovakia still do not fully comply 
with the international CTF regime due the absence of criminal liability for legal 
persons from their legal frameworks. The debate on criminal liability of legal persons 
is no longer whether to have corporate liability but what form it should take, once 
introduced. The traditional objection to imposing penal responsibility on legal persons 
is a feature of German criminal law culture, which is fundamental for Central 
European countries. However, in connection to CTM/AML regimes, the debate on the 
adoption of the concept as such is no longer relevant. In most jurisdictions, the 
administrative sanctions or prosecution under the civil code are gradually being 
replaced by direct criminal provisions74.  
                                                          
71 Signed on September 6, 2000; the late ratification was caused by the fact that the Czech Republic was not able 
to meet its obligations laid down in Article 5 and partly in Article 8 Sections 1 and 2 of the Convention. These 
obligations concern both the liability of legal persons in connection with the financing of terrorism and the 
detection, freezing and confiscation of financial means used or earmarked for the financing of terrorism and 
proceeds coming from such operations. The Convention was ratified despite the fact that the law on criminal 
liability of legal persons was rejected by the Czech Chamber of Deputies in January 2006. The Czech Republic 
claims that it is able to fulfil its obligations under Article 5 by using the provisions of civil law rather than criminal 
law; for example, there is liability under civil law relating to unfair competition. After 9/11, the general tendency is 
to provide for criminal liability of legal persons in order to deal better with all terrorism financing related issues and 
the debate on the introduction of a form of criminal liability of legal persons is under way in the Czech Republic, 
see bellow.   
72 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) was established by the G-7 Summit in Paris in July 1989 to examine 
measures to combat money laundering. Originally comprising the G-7 member States, the European 
Commission, and eight other countries, the FATF was later also mandated to focus on terrorism financing. FATF 
also has a mandate to review existing national and international legislation and enforcement, and define further 
measures needed to combat money laundering and terrorism financing. 
73 In 2005 the Council also agreed a general approach on the Regulation on Funds Transfers. Similarly, a 
proposal for a Payment Services Directive (adopted by the European Commission on 1 December 2005) and The 
Framework Decision on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to confiscation orders is still subject 
to a parliamentary scrutiny reservation. 
74 Among the “old” EU member states, the aversion to the introduction of this concept was the strongest in 
Germany, Italy, and Spain.  
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Multilateral international pressure75 has been brought to bear on the Central 
European countries studied to introduce criminal liability for legal persons into their 
Criminal codes. In Hungary, Act CIV of 2001 on Measures Applicable to Legal 
Entities under the Criminal Code was adopted by Parliament in December 2001 and 
entered into force at the same time as the Act publishing the international instrument 
on Hungary’s accession to the European Union76. Also Act CXXI of 2001 amending 
the Criminal Code introduced criminal liability for managers of businesses. In Poland, 
the Act of 28 October 2002 on the Liability of Collective Entities for Acts Prohibited 
subject to Penalty was adopted and entered into force in November 2003. It 
regulates the penal liability of collective entities in a comprehensive manner and 
introduces a broad definition of the collective entities subject to such liability, 
including both legal persons and organisational entities without legal personality. The 
Act provides for a number of penal sanctions, beginning with fines and forfeiture of 
benefits, bans on promoting or advertising the business activities, products or 
services and prohibitions on using financial support from public funds and aid 
provided by international organisations. 
 
The Czech Republic and Slovakia continue to be the countries where for various 
reasons criminal liability of legal persons has not yet been adopted77. In the Czech 
Republic, after giving up on incorporating the change in the amendment of the Penal 
Code, a new stand-alone law on criminal liability of legal persons was drafted but 
                                                          
75 Besides the conventions related to terrorism financing, OECD pressure connected to the Convention dealing 
with the Bribery of a Foreign Public Officials can also be mentioned. The various rounds of compliance evaluation 
have been taking place under the auspices of different organizations depending on the different topic areas – 
from bribery to money laundering. As a follow-up, Slovakia for example already planned to introduce criminal 
liability of legal persons by 1 January 2002. The provisions are still not in place.  
76 The Hungarian authorities explained that the purpose of this postponement was, on the one hand, to allow 
judicial authorities and law practitioners to acquire training, and, on the other hand, to take into account possible 
commentaries or recommendations before the entry into force of the new law. 
77 Most of the legislators, legal practitioners, representatives of bar associations and academics in criminal law 
opposed the government’s proposals of creating criminal liability of legal persons both in the Czech Republic and 
in Slovakia. Most believed that the concept contradicts a basic principle of criminal law, namely that criminal 
liability derives from the fault of an individual, not a legal person. Some felt the concept offends the principle of 
non bis in idem (double jeopardy) because it punishes both natural and legal persons for the same offence. In 
Slovakia, it is believed that the proposed sanctions, such as the dissolution of a company, would have been too 
draconian. Some feared that the police could abuse the law. One academic added that liability against legal 
persons is not necessary in a jurisdiction like Slovakia where there are sufficient sanctions against natural 
persons. Another academic stated that the draft bill did not adequately protect the interests of third parties (e.g. 
shareholders and employees of the legal person). See OECD, Slovak Republic: Report on the application of the 
Convention on combating bribery of foreign public officials in international business transactions and the 1997 
recommendation on combating bribery in international business transactions, November 2005, 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/28/15/35778308.pdf. 
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rejected by the Parliament in January 200678. In Slovakia in a similar manner, the 
Draft act on criminal liability of legal persons and on the amendment and 
supplementing of certain laws was tabled by the government in February 200679. The 
National Council of Slovak Republic discussed the governmental proposal in April 
2006 but did not manage to approve it before its mandate expired. The new Slovak 
Parliament convened in July 2006. In both countries, the former main opposition 
parties formed the new governments; given their resistance to the drafts on criminal 
liability of legal persons, tabled under previous governments, it is quite unlikely that 
the new legislation will be proposed and enter into effect soon.  
 
According to the IMF reports on Hungary and the Czech Republic and the Council of 
Europe reports on Poland and Slovakia, there is an absence of law enforcement 
results in the sense of specific prosecutions, convictions and asset recovery under 
the CFT regime. In all four countries, Finance intelligence units (FIUs), performing a 
mostly analytical role, were successfully established in mid 1990´s80, at first 
particularly fulfilling those tasks resulting from AML regime. Two templates were 
used; FIUs established at National Police Headquarters, as in Slovakia81 and 
Hungary, and FIUs established by the Ministry of Finance, as in the Czech Republic 
and Poland82. The FIUs main tasks are to receive, analyze and disseminate reports 
from financial institutions on transactions which are suspicious in terms of AML/CFT 
regimes83. It seems that the FIUs working within the ministries of finance are better 
                                                          
78 The Czech Chamber of deputies rejected the draft law on criminal liability of legal persons already in November 
2004. More specifically, it was the opposition Civic Democratic Party (ODS) which opposed it; however, it is fair to 
say that the draft was ill-designed, failing to designate the areas of application properly.  
79 Likewise in the case of Slovakia, the government proposed, and the legislature rejected, legislation on the 
subject in 2005. In early 2005, the government drafted a new Penal Code which provided for criminal liability of 
legal persons. After submitting the draft to the legislature for approval, the government withdrew the draft in the 
face of numerous amendments suggested by the legislature. In May 2005, the government submitted another 
draft to Parliament. Parliament adopted this draft after removing the provisions on liability of legal persons from 
the bill. 
80 All Central European FIUs meet the Egmont Group (Egmont group is the international network of FIUs for 
information exchange and best practice development) criteria, are members of the Egmont Group and are 
connected to the Egmont security web. Poland is very active in the transformation of the Egmont Group into a 
formal international organisation and has repeated its readiness to host the official seat of the Secretary of the 
future international organisation.  In January 2006 Poland officially put up its candidature. Since EU accession, 
the other Central European countries can also exchange information with foreign FIUs in accordance with Council 
Decision (Council Decision No 2000/642/JHA of 17 October 2000 concerning arrangements for cooperation 
between financial intelligence units of the Member States in respect of exchanging information). It can provide a 
formal basis for the cooperation with the countries with which no separate agreements are concluded.   
81 Slovak FIU is part of the Office of the Financial Police of the Police Force. 
82 In Poland, the General Inspector of Financial Information (GIIF) constitutes the FIU, with the head of the unit 
(General Inspector) acting as an under-secretary of state in the Ministry of Finance. 
83 The system for reporting suspicious transactions requires banks and various financial institutions, inter alia, to 
report “unusual business operations” to the FIUs, an “unusual business operation” being defined as an action 
which “may enable” money laundering or terrorist financing. Each reporting entity must create a compliance 
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able to pursue their controlling functions and are usually also staffed more sufficiently 
for the purpose of fulfilling all assigned tasks84 as compared to the FIUs working 
within the police force. On the other hand, finance ministry-based FIUs do not posses 
the powers to complain and therefore cannot influence the decisions of the 
prosecutor’s office. Also cooperation between finance ministry-based FIUs and law 
enforcement bodies seem to be more complicated. Other problems FIUs face in 
Central Europe include: ineffective cooperation between some financial institutions, 
the lack of central registers of bank accounts, the relatively slow process of 
establishing the identity (“deanonymization”) of account holders and the language 
barrier, since not many employees of these units or special police investigative units 
are able to effectively monitor communication in Arabic. However, even where the 
FIUs are fully operational, the problems are usually shifted to the law enforcement 
authorities and judiciary, which often fail to take the issue further.  
 
The implementation of the new legal frameworks has usually been followed by a 
clash of competencies and a reshuffling of responsibilities; according to one expert, 
the responsible authorities were unwilling to accept new criminal offences since the 
situation in the Central Europe was regarded as "calm" in terms of terrorist financing 
operations. In the Czech Republic, the absence of any law enforcement results 
leading to prosecutions, convictions and asset recovery for specific money laundering 
and terrorism financing led to the creation of a specialized police unit85 and the 
establishment of an interdepartmental task force86. Nevertheless, no sentence has 
yet been passed in connection with any case of suspected terrorism financing, 
despite the fact that the FIU has investigated and reported several cases87. In 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
department to implement its reporting duties. It must also maintain certain records relating to the transaction and 
the client for a certain period of time, and produce those records for the FIU upon demand. 
84 According to the reports mentioned, particularly the supervisory functions might fit poorly in a police-based FIU, 
due to the high potential for blurring of supervisory, investigatory, and enforcement roles.  
85 A special financial police unit (FIPO) was created in July 2004 with as one of its main tasks the financing 
terrorism agenda. This agenda had to be pursued by the unit for international cooperation and terrorism financing 
(OMSFT), which was created within FIPO. Cooperation had to be established with other police units specialising 
in organised crime as well as with the intelligence community and the Czech FIU. However, FIPO’s activities were 
rather modest at the beginning. Most of the employees recruited in 2004 were young graduates without any 
experience. In creating the new unit, the police allegedly gave greater weight to the candidates´ university 
degrees and physical condition than to experience with financial crime; consequently, although many custom 
officers and tax authorities’ employees applied for positions, they were not recruited (Kafka, 2005). However, the 
current government proposed the dissolution of FIPO due the underperformance in November 2006, with the 
employees being incorporated into the other relevant police units.  
86 The so-called “Clearing House” 
87 Payments to Islamic centres were investigated; firstly, the sponsorship contribution by the Al Haramein 
Foundation and Third World Relief Agency – TWRA, organizations which have been investigated elsewhere for 
financing terrorist organizations and, secondly, the contributions by Saudi Arabian citizens who are known for 
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Hungary in 2003, a special unit was set up within the police to freeze financial assets 
of suspected terrorists and terrorist organisations. According to the 2005 IMF report 
on Hungary, only seven prosecutions for money laundering had been reported since 
2001 with the predominant named-offences being fraud, misappropriation, and illegal 
financial service activities. In Poland, the major reason prosecution cases are usually 
thrown out is the failure to define the original crime that constituted the source of 
assets which are the subject of financial transactions. The limited notion of “financial 
transaction” and the particularly complex rules on financing terrorism offences could 
be among the reasons why these offences are difficult to prosecute. Also the police 
and the judiciary lack experience in the field; many cases are usually turned into tax 
fraud cases, which are more easily sentenced. The authorities also do not pay 
sufficient attention to the connection between offences linked to organized crime, and 
money laundering and financing terrorism. Although specialized bodies have been 
created to gather intelligence on organized crime, this information has rarely been 
widely used to tackle the AMl/CFT cases88. There is a need for specialized training, 
particularly for the public prosecutors89 and the judiciary. It is also important to create 
case law and jurisprudence to test the adequacy of the CTF regime offences and 
identify the position of the courts with respect to evidentiary requirements. 
 
In some of the countries surveyed90, the legislation should be amended to allow for 
the unconditional freezing of assets of terrorists or of those supporting them or 
terrorist organizations financially and, in others, where the legislation already exists, it 
is often in need of clarification. All Central European countries have legislation 
recognizing and employing asset–freezing mechanisms on conviction; it is the lack of 
clarity as to the circumstances in which this can occur without conviction, and again 
the absence of the criminal liability for legal persons in Slovakia and the Czech 
Republic, which are the problems91 which need to be solved to ensure compliance 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
having supported Muslim fighters in Bosnia. It is believed that Hamas is financed from profit made by certain 
individuals in the real estate business in Prague.  
88 In the Czech case, the explanation could also be the rivalry that exists between various police units, 
unwillingness to share information, and the relative “youth” of the departments created for CTF cases in the 
Police.   
89 There is a recommendation to appoint a public prosecutor specializing in terrorism since there are usually 
problems with the application of the CTF provisions of the new penal codes. 
90 Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia  
91 There are also other relevant legal problems, such as that which arises when measures to confiscate the 
proceeds of crime or the property used to finance terrorism are in place when the proceeds of crime or property 
are linked to terrorist-related offences, but there is no provision for the mandatory and systematic confiscation or 
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with, amongst others, the United Nations Security Council Resolutions92 in this field. 
In addition, clear procedures for delisting and unfreezing are also missing elsewhere 
(Hungary), and some issues related to the responsibility of financial institutions for 
freezing assets on the basis of an wrong evaluation of a suspicious transaction have 
to be tackled (Czech Republic).    
 
No review of the weaknesses of their Not-for-Profit Organization sectors has yet been 
undertaken in Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia, although their action plans 
envisage such a review, as well as for the drafting of better oversight measures. The 
relaxed provisions on foundations and NGOs need to be tightened up, transparency 
in the sector needs to be increased by strengthening the legal basis for supervision 
and oversight of NPO fundraising. Consultations should be carried out with the sector 
representatives on ways of improving transparency and reporting93. 
 
Fighting terrorism financing must be successful worldwide for it to be successful at 
all; in this respect, the Central European countries studied or at least some of them 
have to improve their efforts, particularly in the field of law enforcement. Also 
changing the ruling general perception that countering terrorism financing is 
somehow ineffective since the costs of carrying out a terrorist attack are not high is 
important. Improving the CTF regime is a continuous effort, just as the state 
authorities have made progress in adjusting their legal and other tools, so the 
strategies and practices of the organized groups have been upgraded too. Today, 
unlike four or five years ago, forms of money laundering are very sophisticated. In 
order to achieve better results, not only law enforcement agencies, the judiciary and 
FIUs need to improve their expertise, but also the banks and other financial 
institutions have to introduce appropriate measures, including the training of the 
ordinary employees in CTF regimes and measures. All the countries studied are 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
forfeiture of the object of the offence, i.e. the laundered money or property. This may lead to situations where the 
object of the offence cannot be confiscated/forfeited (Czech Republic, Hungary).  
92 United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 1267 and 1373 followed by EC Regulations 881/2002 
and 2580/2001, which are self-executing in the EU member state; by EC Regulation 881/2002 of May 2002, the 
EU has adopted embargo measures against persons and organisations suspected of having relations with Osama 
bin Laden, the Al Qaeda network and the Taliban. It is by EC Regulation 2580/2001 of December 2001 that the 
EU complied with the United Nations resolution in accordance with which all countries are required to freeze all 
capital and other financial assets or economic resources (e.g. also direct or indirect deliveries) of persons who are 
suspected of committing or try to commit terrorist attacks or who are involved in their planning or support them. 
These regulations also prohibit the provision of capital and other financial assets or economic resources to the 
benefit of these persons. 
93 The debate on the controversial NGO code of conduct related to the fight against terrorism and prepared by the 
EU Commission has, for example, already taken place in the Czech Republic.  
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taking more or less comprehensive steps in this direction, usually financed by the 
international donors; the most notable effort is being made in Poland94.   
 
There are policy areas where lack of experience truly calls for template adoption; the 
measures to counter the tendencies to become the safe heavens for the preparation 
and planning of terrorist operations, including financial operations, are the prime 
examples as along with the strategies to counter radicalization and recruitment. 
Implementing viable models which would fit the domestic settings and conditions, 
also calls for political support and a strong public mandate. However, the Central 
European countries studied today are characterised by unfocused governmental 
leadership and guidance in this area, and an absence of involved and informed 
parliaments. With the exception of issues connected with the functioning of the 
intelligence services and special police forces, security clearances, the use of illegal 
wiretappings for political purposes and the disapproval of both the radical left and 
right of the political spectrum of general foreign policy lines adopted by governments, 
counterterrorism is not a largely political issue, subjected to the usual competition for 
ideas which is considered a normal part of democratic accountability. This is so, 
despite the fact that all leading politicians in the region have declared 
counterterrorism to be a priority in numerous official documents, plans and 
strategies95. Another issue is that the budget for counterterrorism remains quite 
limited or is even being downsized despite the growing economies in the Central 
European countries studied. The reasons for this are, again, the low threat 
perception and the feeling that such expenditure is somehow irrelevant. Not only do 
the budget lines for the operational activities remain low but also investment in 
research and development is rather limited.  
 
                                                          
94 Polish FIU launched two-week e-learning courses in 2005 with 3.442 persons participating. Also a new edition 
of the Counteracting money laundering – Guide for obligated institutions and cooperating units was issued in 
2005. The material also analyze the suspicious transactions and discusses the methods of money laundering, 
presents the typology and examples of models and schemes associated with the transactions suspected of 
money laundering. Such a toolkit is missing in the Czech Republic for example. See Information of the General 
Inspector of Financial Information on Counteracting Introduction into Financial Circulation of Property Values 
Derived from Illegal or Undisclosed Sources and on Counteracting the Financing of Terrorism, Ministry of 
Finance, Republic of Poland, March 2006, 
http://www.mofnet.gov.pl/_files_/giif/materialy_konferencyjne/sprawozdanie_2005_ang.doc 
95 Only the Slovak President, Rudolf Schuster, in light of the upcoming presidential elections (April 2004) voiced 
concerns that the government of then PM Mikulas Dzurinda was not doing enough to ensure the people's safety 
in connection to terrorism, and in particular the Madrid bombing. See for example 
http://www.slovakspectator.sk/clanok-15584.html 
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Some experts interviewed for this paper stated that in fact the level of political 
involvement mirrors the level of actual security threat posed by global terrorism in 
these countries; some claim persistent lack of interest by any government in office 
since the beginning of 1990´s; as one expert put it: “Counterterrorism is not a political 
issue here. The line between preparedness and panic has not been approached, let 
alone tested.” Some sense that there has been a lack of public diplomacy to elicit 
citizens´ support for crisis response measures or other measures, which could be 
perceived as possible violations of human rights; and some believe that other 
security threats like extremism, economic criminality or the fight against corruption 
are being unfairly prioritized. Experts from the public administration domain see the 
political involvement as sufficient, stating that the governments´ reactions to previous 
terrorist attacks were appropriate and subsequently became embodied in strategies 
and action plans. They also point to the fulfilment of the obligations arising out of 
NATO and EU membership, namely co-operation on the legislation making and 
involvement in military and non-military operations under the auspices of NATO and 
the EU. They also feel that the information channels between the expert communities 
and politicians are functioning well, providing sufficient clarification of proposed policy 
measures.   
 
 
II. Counterterrorism policies in Central Europe – selected issues 
 
 
In the second part of this paper, three issues which are seen as crucial in terms of 
counterterrorism policies and the decision-making will be touched upon separately; in 
relation to the overarching topic already dealt with at a number of points elsewhere.   
 
Intelligence services 
  
Together with the national police forces, the intelligence services carry out most 
counterterrorism work. At the beginning of 1990´s, the Central European countries 
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studied96 had to redefine the mandate of their intelligence services; this was largely 
undertaken without a proper public debate on purposes and goals. The redefinition 
process already contained malfunctions as well as carrying the seeds of future 
abuses. This resulted in numerous affairs where the intelligence services were either 
taken hostage by the politicians or proved unable to function properly. Continuous 
reform attempts have brought mixed results; although partly driven by the NATO and 
EU accession, the primary impetus for most of the changes has been the need to 
overcome the legacy of the previous regimes and the political struggles within the 
Central European countries themselves.  
 
Intelligence activities are organized differently in each country, reflecting unique 
historical circumstances. All Central European countries have multiple intelligence-
gathering agencies with divided responsibilities, since there were concerns about 
creating a monolithic intelligence service which would be too powerful, although the 
existence of multiple actors in the sector may and does complicate the intelligence 
sharing, analysis and cooperation. The division between military and civilian 
intelligence has also been retained; with military intelligence exclusively gathering 
information connected to the defence field97.  
 
Former communist security services were discontinued at the beginning of the year 
1990 but not all officers and agents could be released at once; each of the Central 
European countries studied dealt with this problem in its own way. The general trend 
was to perform security checks on professional cadres, to dismiss those civil servants 
most compromised by the regime, to form new institutions and recruit new people as 
in addition to those retained after successfully undergoing the vetting procedure98. 
The process could not be accelerated as the dismissed agents were a potential 
security threat to the new democracies. In the process, many contact networks built 
                                                          
96 With the exception of Slovakia; whose intelligence service (BIS) was established in 1992-93, following the 
pattern of the Czechoslovak federal intelligence structures (FBIS) established in the1990.  
97 From the counterterrorism point of view, due the lack of coordination between military and civilian intelligence, 
much useful data on terrorist groups collected, for example, during foreign military missions (Afghanistan, former 
Yugoslavia) has been lost to civilian counterintelligence. 
98 However, there have been several cases of prominent agents of previous regimes who are known to have 
managed to get through the vetting procedure (lustrations), carefully preparing their hearings in advance, by 
helping out the future elites which later sat on the lustration commissions; with many documents having 
disappeared into the shredding, the testimony of a particular person usually allowed former agents to retain their 
jobs. Another issue is the military intelligence services, which were left largely intact for quite a long time, at least 
in case of Poland and Czech Republic.    
 37
under previous regimes were lost in whole or in part, and new partners were 
understandably cautious and hesitant to cooperate99.  
 
The intelligence services in Central Europe and their important role in the fight 
against terrorism raise several important questions: have they already coped 
successfully with the inheritance of the communist era and are the relevant systems 
in place, including supervision? Are these services already fully-fledged and 
trustworthy partners for their Western counterparts? Finally, do they have the 
competencies and capabilities necessary to cope with the new global security 
threats? 
 
In the Czech Republic, the federal structures of the intelligence services were 
replaced by a new system after the so-called “velvet divorce”, which saw the break-
up of the former Czechoslovakia. At the moment, three intelligence services operate 
in the Czech Republic: the Security Information Service (BIS, a civil 
counterintelligence agency), responsible to the whole government, the Office for 
Foreign Relations and Information (UZSI, a civil intelligence agency), responsible to 
the Ministry of Interior and without parliamentary supervision, and Military Intelligence 
(VOZ), which is part of the Ministry of Defence, comprising the Military Intelligence 
Service and Military Defensive Intelligence100. As one expert has put it, besides the 
merger of the military intelligence, which has been in effect since January 2005, no 
serious steps have as yet been taken to reform the intelligence services in the Czech 
                                                          
99 Also the trust of the general public in the intelligence services was generally very low due to memories of the 
previous regimes. However, despite all the scandals, it now seems it has been partially rebuilt. A special 
Hungarian poll on counterterrorism policies showed that intelligence services are considered by 40% of the 
respondents to be a very effective tool in counterterrorism, a higher percentage score than that achieved by the 
police, the diplomatic service and the military. This may be for two reasons: first, it is seen as the most effective 
tool because it is this body which is linked in people’s minds with measures such as “arresting terrorist leaders”, 
“hunting down terrorists”, “controlling terrorist supporter countries”, which were the possible answers given in the 
poll. Secondly, the scandals related to the intelligence services, as the author of the survey suggests, were mainly 
followed by the more-educated sections of the public, whilst the wider general public tended to concentrate on the 
general threat of terrorism and the need for special actions, taken under cover (Molnar, 2005).  
100 The basic legal provision in this field is Act No. 153/1994 Coll. on the Intelligence Services of the Czech 
Republic. This act regulates in particular the position, powers, coordination, cooperation and control over the 
intelligence services of the Czech Republic, it imposes tasks on them, and regulates reporting and disclosure of 
information to them. Pursuant this act, responsibility for activities of intelligence services of the Czech Republic 
lies with the government of the Czech Republic. Important tasks in this sphere are executed by the State Security 
Council and its Intelligence Activity Committee. Special statutes regulate things like the use of particular means, 
information acquisition and record keeping of personal data kept by Security Information Service and MDI as well 
as the position of members of intelligence services and their status: Act No. 154/1994 Coll. on Security 
Information Service; Act No. 67/1992 Coll. on the Military Defensive Intelligence, the Intelligence Services Act; Act 
No.  361/2003 Coll. on the Status of Members of the Armed Forces and Act No. 362/2003 Coll. on Amendment to 
Acts in Connection with Adoption of the Act on the Status of Members of the Armed Forces.   
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Republic101. There is a lack of political will to undertake major systemic reform. 
Appointed after the June 2006 elections, the new right-wing government, took certain 
steps in order to centralize the coordination of intelligence gathering and analysis and 
to develop one way delivery to the consumers. It also proposed the merger of civil 
counterintelligence and intelligence, dismissing the head of the intelligence agency. 
Leaving to one side the fact that the government had not been confirmed by 
Parliament by winning the necessary vote of confidence and arguably did not have 
the legitimacy to undertake the major reform of the intelligence services, the 
proposed steps were neither systemic nor widely debated; and it appeared to many 
that such reforms owed much to the settling of political scores. The expert community 
has recommended a number of steps; the appointment of a minister responsible for 
civil counterintelligence (BIS) and the abolition of whole-government collective 
responsibility for the intelligence services. Further down the line, it argues that the 
intelligence agency (UZSI) should be subject to parliamentary supervision102, with 
ministerial responsibility shifted from the interior to the foreign ministry. The 
competencies of the intelligence services should be enlarged and strengthened103, 
which is also the intention stated in the interior ministry’s National Action Plan to 
Combat Terrorism 2005–2007. 
  
The Czech intelligence services have suffered from several domestic as well as the 
international scandals; the best-known revelations came when then-Prime minister 
Milos Zeman announced on CNN in November 2001 that the Czech intelligence 
services could prove that one of the 9/11 hijackers Mohammed Atta had repeatedly 
come to the Czech Republic for meetings with the Iraqi diplomats, providing a 
possible connection between 9/11 and the former Iraqi regime. This later turned out 
to be a red herring104. The Czech military intelligence services were accused of 
mismanaging a significant part of their secret operations budget in September 2002 
                                                          
101 No reforms were proposed in connection with 9/11; the only significant opinion voiced publically was that of the 
former head of the Military intelligence services, Andor Sandor, who urged the Czech Republic to adopt the British 
intelligence model. 
102 The existing legislation does not stipulate the existence of a special parliamentary committee for the control of 
UZSI (civil intelligence agency). Despite the fact that its work would probably be limited to only two elements, 
budget control and control of the compliance with the law, the introduction of parliamentary control is seen as 
essential. 
103 See below 
104 Some experts claim it was due an effort to please U.S. officials by providing the kind of information they 
wanted to hear.  
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and also of leaking a list of their agents105. As in Poland, the military intelligence 
services underwent limited reform in terms of human resources; changes occurred in 
connection with NATO accession. There were also several wiretapping scandals 
involving not only the intelligence agencies but also special police units, as well as 
leaks of classified reports to the media106.    
 
Although legislative reform has not been undertaken, organisational reform in terms 
of the internal coordination and international cooperation is slowly taking place, 
namely thanks to the EU and NATO pressure. The informal coordination bodies, 
which were established, in some cases also by the impetus and recommendations of 
the external evaluations, namely the EU peer evaluation mission, will most probably 
be “legalized” and implemented in upcoming legislation. In 2005 the Common 
Intelligence Group became the working platform on terrorism for the individual 
intelligence services, the interior ministry, the police and the foreign ministry. In 2005 
testing of the system of intelligence agenda coordination was initiated by the Board of 
Directors of Intelligence Services.  
 
NATO and the EU have also been pushing for review of clearance and classification 
regimes. In the Czech Republic, the classification regime has been tougher than in 
the most of the EU member states and it has also lacked flexibility, often leading to 
over classification107, which may also be in breach of the law.  A new law has been 
drafted and approved108, although experts have stated that, once again, the text is 
not very good. First and foremost, the current situation where a wide circle of the 
individuals are, by virtue of their job titles, automatically granted special access to 
                                                          
105 The total budget of both services (still divided at that time) was approximately 1.5 billion CZK (50m Euro 
approx.). The BBC Czech Language Service claimed that most of the funds for secret operations were used for 
events such as visits to the Geneva Autosalon. The leaking of the list of agents also caused major financial losses 
since the agents whose cover had been blown had to be removed instantly from their posts. 
106 Most recently, the so-called “Kubice-gate” contributed to the heated atmosphere before the June 2006 general 
elections. A classified report, prepared by the head of the special police unit for fight against organized crime, Jan 
Kubice, concerning interference by political parties and politicians in police work was deliberately leaked to the 
media by members of parliament from the main opposition party.  
107 The clashes over the dividing lines between protection of classified information and the right to information are 
quite common. For example in February 2004, the Czech Constitutional Court rejected an initiative from the 
Czech Ombudsman that would have compelled the Foreign Ministry to publish information classified by the 
ministry as falling within the category of "sensitive political, security, and economic information concerning 
international relations”. The presiding judge said approval of the initiative could threaten the Czech Republic's 
ability to protect sensitive information. The judge also said international organizations might hesitate to provide 
the Czech Republic with classified information. While conceding that the current (1998) regulations could "in 
theory" lead to abuse, the judge also said citizens may appeal to the courts if they suspect such abuse.  
108 Act N. 412 of 21 September 2005 on the Protection of Classified Information, 
http://www.nbu.cz/en/_download/Act_412_2005_CZ.pdf 
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classified information, irrespective of the classification and without a valid personnel 
security clearance (PSC) is perpetuated109. In this respect, the new act has caused 
renewed problems, especially with NATO. Secondly, as far as the personnel security 
clearance regime is concerned, although the responsible authority assigned the task 
of conducting PSCs is the National Security Authority, the civil intelligence and 
counterintelligence agencies issue their own PSCs for their employees; the system of 
security clearances is not unified and compatible, and although the National Security 
Authority is required to guarantee that it is, it has no competencies to make the 
intelligence services adopt and comply with standard procedures and security levels.    
 
The document on optimalization of the security system of the Czech Republic calls 
for effective communication both in the intelligence community and between the 
intelligence community and the security system as such; it also underlines the need 
for feedback from customers and better coordination on the tasks input side. The 
intelligence services do not at the moment cooperate at the analysis stage for 
gathered information and provide rather different outputs to the consumers. There is 
also a need for a working body to coordinate the intelligence services at an 
operational level, rather than the coordination which is currently taking place within 
the informal Joint Intelligence Group on the level of directors110. Existing 
parliamentary supervision is not functioning well, and one of the problems is the 
blurred line which exists between responsibility resulting from the law on protection of 
classified information, which the deputies are bound by having PSC or not, and the 
vast immunity they enjoy, which allows them to operate with the classified information 
almost with impunity.  
 
In Hungary, in the early 1990´s, the so-called “Duna-gate scandal” led to a rapid 
reform of the system111 including the creation of independent intelligence services. 
                                                          
109 According to Paragraph 58 of the law, special access to classified information irrespective of classification and 
without a valid personnel security clearance (PSC) or briefing is granted ex officio to the President, the Prime 
Minister, the Members of the government, all Deputies and Senators, to the Ombudsman and to his or her deputy, 
to all judges and to the President, Vice–president and Members of the Supreme Audit office.  
110 Another issue is also the cooperation between intelligence operatives and ministry officials. These links 
operate solely on a personal basis and with frequent post changes, especially in foreign ministries, the 
connections to the intelligence community are often lost and have to be rebuilt again. An institutionalization of the 
cooperation on the operational level should be considered.   
111 On 5 January 1990, two newly established Hungarian political parties, the Alliance of Free Democrats 
(SZDSZ) and the Alliance of Young Democrats, (FIDESZ), revealed that the state security organisation of the 
Ministry of Interior had been collecting information about opposition parties despite the prohibition laid down in the 
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According to one expert, this was done too quickly and the Hungarian system still 
suffers from the legacy of this hasty reform. The political elites have never shown 
interested in reforming the intelligence services again.  
 
The Hungarian system is made up of the Military Security Office (KBH), the Military 
Reconnaissance Office (KFH), the Information Office (IH, intelligence), and the 
National Security Office (NBH, counterintelligence). Following the Duna-gate scandal, 
all four intelligence services were established in 1990 by the Act on the Interim 
Regulation of Special Clandestine Means and Methods. The new Act on National 
Security, regulating the operation of the services, came into force in March 1996. On 
the basis of this act, the National Security Special Service (NBSZ), which is 
authorised to carry out secret intelligence gathering, became just another 
independent security service. Supervision of the civilian intelligence services was 
exercised by a minister without portfolio between 1990 and 2002. Since May 2002 
the minister leading the Prime Minister's Office has been responsible for the 
supervision of the civilian services and the National Security Committee of the 
National Assembly also exists, exercising parliamentary control. As elsewhere in the 
region, the Hungarian intelligence services complain of budget restrictions112, modest 
technical support and uneven but continuous staff fluctuations.  
 
In Poland, a new agency Office for State Protection (UOP) was formed after 1990; as 
in the former Czechoslovakia (later in the Czech Republic) and Hungary, it was 
staffed mainly by the employees of the former security agency who successfully 
passed a verification procedure. Until 1996, it functioned as a department of the 
Ministry of Interior, then it was transformed into a separate government agency under 
the supervision of the Prime Minister. Its mission was primarily general espionage 
and intelligence gathering as well as counterespionage and the fight against 
organized crime. It was headed by a career intelligence officer but directly supervised 
by a government official – the Coordinator for the Special Services. During the time of 
its existence, the UOP was involved in some political fighting over the various 
appointments of its heads, lustration and perceived failures with investigating 
organized crime cases.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
1989 amendment to the Hungarian Constitution. Illegal information gathering was evident from copies of reports 
gained under clandestine circumstances. 
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The socialist government in Poland was planning an extensive reform of the 
intelligence services long before 9/11. In June 2002, the civil intelligence service was 
reorganized and divided into two agencies: the Internal Security Agency (ABW)113 
and the Foreign Intelligence Agency (AW)114, both accountable to the Prime Minister. 
Military intelligence and counterintelligence continued as one institution (WSI) to 
function without organizational change until October 2005 when a new Law and 
Justice Party-led conservative government announced the dissolution of the WSI and 
establishment of two new services – the Military Intelligence Agency and the Military 
Counterintelligence Agency115, employing both military personnel and civilians, and 
falling under the control of the Minister for the Secret Services, and not the Defence 
Ministry like their predecessor. The Intelligence Community (WW) was also founded 
in June 2002 as a result of the reform. It is made up of all the Polish secret services 
and is headed by the Head of the Foreign Intelligence Agency. A post of Minister-
Coordinator of the Special Services, specially created to oversee the Services should 
have been abolished and replaced by WW; however, this did not happened. In 2005, 
the Polish system of protection of classified information was also revamped. 
 
Polish politicians were tempted to use the intelligence services in domestic political 
struggles, too. The best known affair came out in December 1995. It concerned a 
false accusation, brought by the then interior minister Andrzej Milczanowski against 
the Prime Minister Josef Oleksy. The minister, responsible directly to President Lech 
Walesa, used the Office of State Protection (UOP) to spy on the PM and publicly 
accused him in the Parliament of being “a Russian spy”116. There was another 
scandal before the presidential elections in 2000. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
112 In the period of 1992-1997, budget problems led to part of the core staff having to leave. 
113 The ABW was to some extent modelled on the American FBI, although it has no police powers.  
114 The move was widely perceived as a way of cleansing the higher ranks of the intelligence service of officers 
appointed by previous right-wing governments. AW is predominantly about civilian intelligence but there are a 
certain number of military officers, who were already transferred from the WSI in 2002 to work in strategic 
intelligence. ABW´s main tasks are counterintelligence, government electronic security, and fighting corruption 
and organized crime.  
115 The conservative government allegedly feared WSI; it claimed it was full of original “communist” staff and that 
no reform has been undertaken since 1989, which according to the other sources is not true, at least since NATO 
accession in March 1999. The new government also adopted a new law on vetting that allows for the 
reassessment of individuals on the basis of their contacts with the communists secret police. The WSI officers 
were screened and there was a period during which they could confess to past misdeeds. The checked and 
cleared officers were able to join the newly established military intelligence which was to start working since 
October, 2006. (See for example The Economist, August 12, 2006 p. 22, “We’ve got a little list”) 
116 Although unproven, the accusation caused the resignation of the Prime Minister, and the “spy-case” went to 
the Military Prosecutor, who dismissed the alleged testimonies of the UOP agents. Mr. Josef Oleksy was found 
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With the creation of the Slovak Republic, a new intelligence service had to be 
established, capable of continuing the work of the Federal Security Intelligence 
Service (FBIS), the intelligence service of the Czech and Slovak Federative 
Republic117. The Slovak Information Service (SIS) was established by the Slovak 
Information Service Act 46/1993; together with Military intelligence - Military 
Intelligence Service (VSS) and Military Defence Service (VOS) - it constitutes the 
system of the Slovak intelligence services. In February 1995, the director of SIS 
along with those of military intelligence and counterintelligence resigned from their 
posts because of undemocratic developments in Slovakia. Ivan Lexa, a Member of 
Parliament representing the ruling HZDS party of PM Vladimir Meciar was appointed 
director of SIS. In April 1995, the Slovak Parliament approved an amendment to the 
Slovak Information Service Act, according to which the director of the service was 
appointed by the government, and not by the president who was then opposing the 
steps of the Meciar Cabinet. In 1996, SIS was excluded from the group of intelligence 
services – the Middle European Conference (MEC), consisting of 16 intelligence 
services of 13 states of Western and Central Europe. Until 1998, SIS was under 
suspicion of involvement in illegal activities118. In November 1998, the new ruling 
coalition formed after the parliamentary elections cleaned up the intelligence 
services. A special commission was formed to investigate the allegations of illegal 
activities. In the period 1998-2000, the SIS especially went through a broad internal 
reorganization; control mechanisms were created to ensure that the service 
functioned in accordance with the law. In 1999 the SIS re-joined the MEC. The 
Slovak parliament only finally passed a law on classified information in 2001119, 
stipulating basic tasks in protection of classified information. With NATO accession, a 
rigorous vetting system was implemented. In 2003, a series of illegal wiretapping 
scandals damaged the SIS reputation still further and this led to calls to limit, rather 
than widen, its powers. As one expert put it, it may take a long time before trust is 
restored and the trend is reversed, especially in a situation where few seem to 
acknowledge that a terrorist attack on Slovak territory is a real possibility. However, 
reform of the intelligence services is still needed as there is a continuing lack of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
not guilty but the intelligence officers, who were found to have manipulated the accusations, were promoted to 
higher positions by President Lech Walesa. 
117 At the end of 1992 the FBIS was split up under the FBIS Abolition Act 543/1992, following rather complicated 
negotiations concerning the property and information databases of the service. 
118 The SIS allegedly took part in the kidnapping of the son of President Michal Kovac in 1995, as well as in the 
murder of Robert Remias, a former intelligence agent who cooperated with the investigation into the case.  
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transparency, competencies remain unclear, and there are renewed accusations of 
use of unlawful procedures. 
 
The counterterrorism has emerged as the new policy–making driver. Since the 
intelligence services are responsible for ensuring the key aspect in counterterrorism 
policy, namely prevention of terrorist attacks, the demand for enlarging their 
competencies has steadily been increasing. Although it is rightly argued that the 
ability of the intelligence services to obtain timely information is the basic prerequisite 
of successful in the fight against terrorism, there are many issues which need to be 
addressed. Firstly, systems need to be stabilized and protected against the 
temptation on the part of politicians to make abusive use of them. In order to prevent 
this happening, appropriate control and supervision mechanisms must be put in 
place. Secondly, the competencies of the intelligence services have to be 
strengthened and enlarged; at the same time, in order to avoid past mistakes, the 
public, as ultimate consumers, need to be encouraged to engage in an intelligent, 
non-political debate on intelligence outputs and the scope of competencies required 
to achieve them. 
 
In the case of the Czech Republic, since 2003 a set of new legislative proposals has 
been developed, not only largely relying on foreign templates for designing the policy 
but also in order to legitimate the call for extended competencies of the intelligence 
services120. There are several issues which should be addressed in such a debate; 
firstly, the public perception that bodies ask for wider competencies than are needed. 
Secondly, the problems inherent in the transfer of checks and balances templates; 
the two legislative proposals, which were announced recently in the Czech Republic 
– the amendments to the existing law on the intelligence services extending their 
competencies and the act on intelligence services oversight121 – are drafted 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
119 Classified Information Protection Act 241/2001 Coll. 
120 In relation to telecoms operators for example, the official report argues for (1) the existence of common 
databases of users of telecommunication operations and provision of information from them pointing to the 
example of Germany, Italy, Denmark; (2) for  expenses to be borne proportionally (Belgium, the Netherlands, 
United Kingdom, Austria, Poland, Denmark, Sweden, Turkey) and (3) for the deanonymisation of telephone cards 
following the examples of the United Kingdom, Germany, Slovenia, Slovakia, Italy and Switzerland.  
121 A special act on supervision of the intelligence services had already been prepared in the Czech Republic in 
1997; according to one expert; the draft was of a high quality, allowing for a high degree of control, whilst at the 
same time avoiding harmful interference in the day-to-day work of the intelligence services. It was not adopted 
because a Senate supervision committee was promised; however, in the Czech Constitution the government is 
not accountable to the Senate. In addition, the creation of the Senate was largely unpopular with the Czech 
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separately with two different initiating documents and comparative analyses as the 
basis122. This approach already contains the danger of neglecting important parts of 
control mechanisms and poses the question of the very transferability of certain 
elements to the Czech milieu.   
 
Legislative proposals for enhancing the competencies of the intelligence services in 
relation to the fight against terrorism were made in accordance with the conclusions 
of the „Analysis of the Scope of Legal Competencies of the Intelligence Services and 
the Police of the Czech Republic Necessary for Execution of Their Tasks Related to 
Combating International Terrorism“123. The analysis was concluded in 2004 by the 
Ministry of Interior in cooperation with intelligence services and the Police of the 
Czech Republic. The document describes the current legal powers in comparison 
with the scope of legal powers of selected foreign counterparts, and argues for a 
significant extension of competencies, as well as for the “legalization” of a number of 
practices which are already taking place. Among the steps recommended are: 
regular access to further information collected by the public administration and 
selected private individuals124; which means that the intelligence services and law 
enforcement authorities would have the data they were previously prevented from 
obtaining under the normal regime125. There is also a call for the creation of a 
common database and evaluating system, the so-called common “knowledge fund”; 
such a step would require high security standards, especially in terms of data privacy 
protection. An Electronic Communications Act is also suggested to impose a duty on 
physical persons or corporate bodies involved in the business of providing 
communication services, usually at the request of the intelligence agency (UZSI), to 
establish and ensure the connection of devices for wiretapping and recording 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
political elites. Despite being established by the Constitution, it only started operating in 1996. The new law has 
not been tabled yet. 
122 The drafting of the Act on control of intelligence services will be largely based on the document „Summary of 
Factual Solutions to Control of Intelligence Services by the Parliament of the Czech Republic“, which was drafted 
in 2004 by an expert working group within the Intelligence Activity Committee, under the guidance of the head of 
the Prime Minister’s Department of the Office of the Government of the Czech Republic. This document foresees 
the establishment of a control authority concerning all intelligence services of the Czech Republic. Experience 
from abroad was used during the preparation of this document, not only from legislative regulations of EU 
member states, but also from the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. 
123 Acknowledged by the government by Resolution No. 737 of 15 June 2005 
124 Information from public bodies on tax proceedings, banks and other financial institutions and private 
companies – in particular information about account numbers and their holders and about ongoing bank 
transactions, names, addresses and account numbers of participating persons, and also information from social 
security or health insurance systems, information from private air carriers or other selected private firms and 
companies, information from providers of postal services, information about securities trading, etc.  
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information to their electronic communication network, and to do so at their own 
expense126. Additionally, intelligence services should benefit from an exception to the 
normal data protection rules, allowing them to process sensitive data, and where  
urgent, they should be allowed to use intelligence technology immediately, without 
waiting for the usual permission, on condition that a request is made to regularise the 
situation, within a certain, precisely determined time limit127. Legal powers need to be 
conferred on relevant authorities (including intelligence services) to interfere with and 
switch off electronic communication networks128, etc.  
 
In case of the intelligence services in Central Europe, the templates have been used 
more to justify changes than for actual modelling129. Western pressure has helped to 
consolidate the sector; on a bilateral basis: being trusted by outside colleagues is the 
sign of professionalism130. The same goes for NATO, which lacks a standing 
intelligence capability and, as such, is unable to offer a model for intelligence reform. 
Instead, NATO accession implied new standards to be met and an increase in 
responsibilities, moreover, new tasks, such as industry security checks, were 
assigned to the intelligence services; in addition the security vetting of individuals 
entrusted with confidential positions was modified to meet NATO demands. The EU 
developed a set of recommendations primarily aimed at strengthening the exchange 
of data between the national intelligence agencies. The need for cooperation 
between intelligence services has necessitated the creation of mechanisms for 
judging effectiveness and control131.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
125 The expansion of legal powers of relevant security bodies and intelligence services concerning obtaining 
information has already been approved in Hungary. 
126 To introduce more effective wiretapping measures and cost sharing with the private bodies is also an issue in 
Poland and Slovakia. Hungary has already approved enhanced competencies for the intelligence services in the 
field of special investigation techniques, including wiretapping – a special office has been established in order to 
deal with these issues (National Security Special Service, NBSZ), see above.  
127 This is rather a codification of the existing procedure.  
128 The same competencies were lacking in Poland but the intelligence services have recently been given the 
right to switch off the mobile networks. 
129 “Despite the potential value of outside help for intelligence reform, however, barriers to obtaining assistance in 
the immediate aftermath of the communist collapse included the reluctance of Western governments to dirty their 
hands by dealing with formerly repressive institutions. Exceptions were made, but the general policy was that the 
new political and institutional leaders should complete their intelligence reforms before Western states and their 
services would engage with them; a counterproductive policy, given that those leaders had no expertise to 
address the issue coherently or effectively. Without expertise or outside assistance, the results of intelligence 
were uniformly sub-optimal” (Watts, 2004). 
130 It is said namely the Polish intelligence score well in this respect. 
131 It is claimed even an informal set of common standards was created. The demands of procedural 
interoperability in the new security environment have already contributed to the success of the Central European 
intelligence services in adapting to the new paradigm (Watts, 2004). 
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Coordination 
 
In the Central European countries studied, with the traditional division of ministries 
and their competencies, the coordination of the counterterrorism policies is hampered 
in several ways; generally, the coordination of the inward- and outward-oriented 
counterterrorism policies presents a problem. Secondly, “operational” coordination 
does not function very well in most cases; information sharing and data exchange, as 
well as the cooperation at a later analysis stage, is complicated132. Thirdly, efforts to 
add another layer of coordination, which would embrace all relevant bodies, usually 
break down over the need for a new legislative basis, the struggle for competencies 
and the resistance of existing institutions. The main issue identified directly or 
indirectly by both types of experts questioned for this paper (i.e. experts working for 
government or other public bodies and the independent experts) is insufficient 
coordination. This was also pinpointed by the EU peer evaluation missions and 
enlisted in the final general report and recommendations133. 
  
The first coordination problem has a lot to do with the division of agendas in the 
nation state and is also present elsewhere. Foreign ministries are usually responsible 
for international legislation and prevention in general along with aspects of the 
counterterrorism policy agenda. There is an even more complicated division of labour 
between defence and interior ministries. On the one hand, it is the defence ministries 
which are primarily responsible for supervising military forces, engaged in the fight 
against the global terrorism. On the other hand, interior ministries have a mixed 
agenda and competencies embracing prevention, as well as consequence 
                                                          
132 To cross information from various sources is crucial, starting already with the threat assessments, which 
should include various inputs from the law enforcement bodies and intelligence agencies; the finalized product 
that each provider controls would be than made available.  
133 The EU has issued 6 recommendations aiming at coordination within the member states and on an EU level: 
1) Political coordination of counterterrorism efforts should be set up at a ministerial level and this structure should 
be responsible for national strategic policy on the prevention of terrorism; on the pursuit and investigation of 
terrorists by the security and law enforcement authorities; on the protection of critical infrastructure and on the 
development national crisis and consequence management arrangements. 2) Counterterrorism Coordinator 
should be appointed. 3) Coordination of prosecutions should be considered, including establishing an authority 
(e.g. a National Prosecutor) responsible for terrorism cases. 4) Member States should also consider putting in 
place national co-ordination arrangements to ensure strong inter-agency cooperation and to ensure that all 
competent national authorities have access to the information and intelligence needed. 5) All sources threat 
assessments: Member States should ensure that national arrangements allow for a coordinated assessment of 
the terrorist threat drawing on all available sources. Those responsible for producing threat assessments should 
respond to the requirements of their customers. 6) Information collection and exchange should be optimized both 
nationally and internationally on all aspects of the terrorist threat with collection priorities reviewed under a 
national requirements system. See EU Council, Final report on the Evaluation of National Anti-Terrorist 
Arrangements: Improving national machinery and capability for the fight against terrorism, September 2005, 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/05/st12/st12168.en05.pdf 
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management. They are however, usually the main bodies for the coordination of 
counterterrorism policies in the EU and, at the same time, they are in charge of 
national strategies for the fight against terrorism.   
 
Two main points are worth noting here: firstly, coordination between interior and 
defence ministries is far from perfect; secondly, the role of the “general” agenda of 
the foreign ministries is declining in the more “particular issue-oriented” atmosphere 
of modern counterterrorism policy-making. In relation to this, foreign ministries 
usually lack any document or strategy which would help them elaborate the generally 
stated priority of fighting terrorism and the approach based on promoting universal 
concepts like human rights in particular measures and institutional processes, which 
could be followed. In formulating counterterrorism policies in the course of inter-
institutional deliberations, it is hard to design an agenda which follows universal 
concepts when concrete steps concerning highly-tangible, usually quite technical 
issues are being decided. Consequently, as no solutions are being offered, foreign 
ministries are loosing ground in the policy-making process and in coordination.  
 
Turning to operational activities coordination, the problem seems to be operational 
information sharing, something which has been resolved in some countries by the 
introduction of a coordination body dealing with the operational agenda134. Again it 
tends to be foreign ministries which have difficulties relating policy steps to the 
operational information. There are coordination bodies which meet on a regular basis 
at a particular level in the hierarchy, usually that of deputy ministers. For foreign 
ministry employees below this level, it is very difficult to obtain any intelligence 
information. Again, informal links with the representatives of the intelligence 
community have to be built and maintained on a personal basis. Regular reshuffling 
of posts at foreign ministries means that these links are frequently lost and every new 
employee assigned with the counterterrorism agenda has to build relations with the 
intelligence community more or less from the scratch. It is probably undesirable to 
formalize links at this level and in view of the difficulties described it almost 
impossible in any event; on the other hand, the establishment of a truly functioning 
                                                          
134 The cooperation of the services at the operational level has been very effectively carried out by the Team for 
Coordination of Operational and Recognition Actions in Poland, chaired by the Head of Agency of Internal 
Security (ABW).  
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coordination body capable of giving access to the operational data to those people in 
the system who are authorized, could help to resolve the problems described.  
 
The Central European countries studied are preparing their national action plans on 
combating terrorism135.  These basically consist of a timetable setting deadlines for 
the fulfilment of particular tasks and distributing responsibilities. The intra-agency 
coordination and cooperation on this particular task appears to work well. In the 
Czech Republic, each public body involved in counterterrorism policy has an 
employee who is assigned the task of preparing that part of the plan for which his or 
her institution is responsible; the central coordination role lies with the interior 
ministry. The action plans are updated on a regular basis. Apart from this, the day to 
day coordination is not running particularly efficiently.    
 
As some authors suggest, the overall trend in security organizations is to erect a 
“scaffold” – a new centre staffed from multiple agencies, designed to encourage and 
facilitate sharing and combine analysis, without limiting their competencies.  
Scaffolds are valid for intra-agency coordination both within a nation state and at the 
international level136 and they are also recommended by the EU as examples of best 
practice. In the Czech Republic, the plan to create a “counterterrorism centre”, which 
would be responsible for all-source information gathering and analysis, would 
coordinate cooperation with the foreign partners and assure one way delivery to the 
foreign counterparts, was dropped by the new government after June 2006 elections. 
The centre should have comprised 30-50 people from the special police units and the 
intelligence services. Instead of creating this new layer, the Head of Civil 
Counterintelligence has been assigned the role of coordinating the fight against 
terrorist activities; in addition, informal coordination bodies are also working on 
regular basis137. In Hungary, the Anti-terrorism Coordination Committee was 
established in 2003, on the basis of a decision by the government’s National Security 
Cabinet.  It is made up of members from all the intelligence services, the police and 
the border guards and surveys and coordinates all current information relevant to the 
security situation of the country. On the basis of this, it initiates concrete secret 
                                                          
135 Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia (in 2005) 
136 (Barger, 2004); the author cites not only EU efforts but also, for example, Saudi-Arabia’s ambitions to create a 
worldwide centre to share intelligence on terrorism. 
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service operations or overt police procedures. The scope of these measures is very 
wide. In Poland, a number of collective bodies were created or reinforced in the 
aftermath of the 9/11, however, the new entities failed to create clear communication 
channels and they worsened rather than improved the chaotic circulation of 
information138. The inter-ministerial collective bodies for coordination include the 
Board for Special Services, the Team for Coordination of Operational and 
Recognition Activities in Respect of Combating Political Terrorism and Inter-
Ministerial Centre for Combating Organized Crime and International Terrorism. Until 
recently there was another inter-governmental body, the so-called WIR, but it was 
dissolved as a result of a decision by the Constitutional Court139. In Slovakia, 
coordination and close cooperation is only provided for in the National Action Plan, 
as one expert has put it; it needs to be strengthened further, both  in general and also 
in connection with the growing agenda. The Security Council, an inter-agency body 
under the Prime Minister, has been identified as a good platform for coordinating 
policies.  
 
The EU Member States have also been asked to consider appointing a high level 
national Counterterrorism Coordinator whose role should be to coordinate the 
counterterrorism activities of governmental as well as law-enforcement and 
intelligence agencies. In the Czech Republic, a coordinator was appointed at the 
foreign ministry in September 2005, following a recommendation and pressure from 
the EU. In fact, despite the fact that the appointee has the same status in the 
hierarchy as the ambassadors, he has no formal competencies in respect of the 
ministries and intelligence services. He cannot give orders to the other ministries 
since this would require new competence legislation. In Slovakia, the national 
Counterterrorism Coordinator was also appointed at the foreign ministry in 2005; 
according to one expert, this arrangement was not found to be effective and the 
position as such did not last long. It seems that ad hoc character of these 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
137 Like the Clearing house (see Countering Terrorism Financing); further proposals on coordination improvement 
are contained in the document on Optimalization of the Security System of the Czech Republic. 
138 (Gogolewska, 2005); as the author puts it: “All those inter-ministerial bodies do not guarantee effective 
coordination in the case of a crisis caused by terrorist attacks. The competencies vested in each of the collective 
bodies are so broadly defined that it is virtually impossible to clearly delineate them. Furthermore, in most cases 
the inter-ministerial bodies are composed of the same high-ranking state officials, such as ministers, state 
secretaries etc. therefore in an emergency they would not know which of those institutions to visit first.” 
139 According to Gogolewska, the fate of WIR, which was disbanded after two years of successful activity, is a 
prime example of the “system fighting back” (Gogolewska, 2005). 
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coordinating institutions means that they are not up to the tasks of advance planning 
and identifying possible problems140. 
 
 
EU role in counterterrorism   
 
After EU accession, the Central European countries studied started to participate in 
counterterrorism agenda-setting and policy-making in the EU141. In Brussels, EU 
efforts in the area of counterterrorism are seen as being driven by the “old” member 
states; the Central European governments are generally perceived as acting 
negligently on the issue. This is caused both by the lack of expertise and resources, 
and the low level of threat perception. As one expert has put it, the political culture in 
Central Europe in general, and in Hungary in particular, suffers greatly from the short-
sighted approach of its politicians. Unless a very concrete and urgent threat suddenly 
arises in relation to Central Europe, EU policy in this area will continue to lack the 
immediate pay off which is needed to make long-term consideration of 
counterterrorism issues possible. The underlying question is how the role of the EU in 
counterterrorism is seen in these Central European countries. 
 
With regard to the lack of expertise and knowledge, as well as the unfinished reform 
of the security sector, a willingness to enhance cooperation should be prevalent 
among the new member states. However, this is not always the case. The lack of 
financing is one factor which plays a large role. For example, terrorism related 
information is only transmitted following a specific request. The steps proposed at the 
EU level such as shifting the practice of data exchange from a reactive to a pro-active 
one or introducing the principle of availability would inter alia involve further 
investment in secure communication systems - systems which are not currently in 
place in most of the Central European countries studied, so enhancing further the 
classified information transmission is primarily seen as just another avoidable budget 
item.  
 
                                                          
140 Also after the Madrid attacks, a network of the so-called “focal points” was established; every member state is 
required to appoint a person responsible for the counterterrorism agenda at their permanent mission to the EU; 
their role is however unclear. At the moment, they rather fulfil the role the documents receiver and distributor.  
141 See (Keohane, 2005)  
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Another issue is the consistency of the proposed measures with existing legal 
frameworks; the Central European countries are largely willing to support proposals 
for amending the existing laws which do not cause problems in terms of the 
implementation burden, always greater when the measure represents a marked 
departure from existing provisions, and deadlines. Usually scrutinized by the justice 
ministries, where proposals cause problems of this nature, it is this ministry which 
usually objects that the content of the proposal is inconsistent in some way with the 
country’s legal tradition.  As one has put expert put it, “…until something happens, it 
is difficult to push new measures through. It depends on the political representation, 
but we are not going to be “troublemakers” if the new measures are in accordance 
with our existing legislative framework”. Considering the unfinished state of the 
legislative frameworks in most of these countries and the lack of primary expertise, 
what is understandable from the view point of domestic politics, nevertheless again 
appears to be rather a short-sighted approach.  
 
The other tendency, observable particularly in case of Poland, is for internal security 
to remain the prerogative of the member states; sometimes used by the politicians in 
order to reinforce the nation state. Consequently, there is almost no support for 
establishing internal security institutions for the EU or extending the competence of 
bodies which already exist, such as Europol or Eurojust, and Poland has also 
suggested rather specific actions which develop the area of freedom, security and 
justice142. Slovakia has also been opposing almost any supranationalization of the 
EU´s Justice and Home Affairs agenda; this has explicitly been the case of the issue 
of illegal immigration. 
 
Concerning the EU counterterrorism agenda, the Central European countries studied 
are promoting their timely accession to Schengen, on the pretext of modernizing the 
Schengen Information System, linked to establishing European borders 
management143. Generally, there is also broad support for the EU Framework for 
countering radicalization, critical infrastructure protection, countering cyber crime and 
the use of the Internet for the purposes of radical Islam and the promotion of terrorist 
                                                          
142 The negative attitude towards the idea of establishing a European Corps of border guards or a European 
Asylum Office (EAO) for example, (Podolski, 2004). The other Central European countries prefer to support the 
enhanced competencies of Europol and Eurojust but the involvement of the staff from their institutions has been 
quite limited for a long time.    
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techniques, including the provisions allowing for removing the illegal content from the 
websites. Overall, the EU is not seen as the place for developing a coherent 
counterterrorism policy template; rather it should continue to provide space for the 
experience exchange and allow for creation of expertise in the fields in which the 
Central European countries lack it.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
143 FRONTEX, The European Border Agency was established in October 2004, with its seat in Warsaw.  
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Conclusion  
 
 
Counterterrorism policy-making in Central Europe is subject to several parallel 
dynamics; it is to a large extent driven by the foreign templates and the pressure to 
comply with the measures and regimes agreed internationally. Domestically driven 
policy-making needs a sense of political urgency and a strong impetus from the ruling 
elite; given the sensitivity of the issues, it quite often also leads to unhealthy over-
politicization and unsystematic solutions. Generally, the political involvement mirrors 
the level of security threat perception; experts have repeatedly stated that unless 
there is an imminent crisis situation caused by an act of terrorism, this tendency is 
unlike to change.   
 
Already in the beginning of 1990´s, counterterrorism policies existed in a limited way 
in the Central European countries studied both institutionally in the form of 
specialized police and intelligence units and in documents setting out the concept. 
However, NATO and EU accession, as well as the influence of the other international 
organizations, has played the key role. The limited experience with global Islamist 
terrorism is one of the crucial variables in this process.  
 
As far as the assumption of the involvement of public opinion is concerned, the polls 
show that threat perception is low and that the Central European public also does not 
think terrorism is the main challenge in the near future. However, it would be wrong to 
assume that the public is not interested in terrorism and counterterrorism measures. 
There are public concerns about the state of preparation of nation state institutions to 
handle the terrorist challenge and a high public demand for further competence 
sharing between the EU and the nation states in the field of counterterrorism.  
 
The absence of experience and expertise calls for the use of foreign templates and 
best practice in some areas of counterterrorism policy-making in Central Europe; also 
pressure from the EU and other international institutions to ensure compliance with 
adopted regimes and standards is needed in order to develop counterterrorism 
policies and the legislative frameworks further. However, the EU is not seen as the 
place for developing a coherent counterterrorism policy template; it should rather 
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continue to provide space for experience exchange and allow for the creation of 
expertise in the fields in which the Central European countries studied lack it.  
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